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ABSTRACT: 
Over the past three decades, Vietnam has transitioned from an agrarian-based, centrally planned 
economy to a mixed economy with emerging market status. Additionally, projections indicate that 
Vietnam will be one of the world’s largest economies by 2050 if growth is sustained at present rates. 
The evolution of the financial sector, which began with the Doi Moi reforms in the mid-1980s, has been 
central to facilitating this growth. As the economy has expanded, Vietnam has maintained a gradualist 
approach to developing market-based mechanisms of resource allocation. However, financial markets 
are still in an embryonic stage and substantial reform is required if the economy is to meet the expected 
rates of development. Against this backdrop, this dissertation critically evaluates trends and dynamics 
in Vietnam’s journey of financial development over the past three decades, with a particular emphasis 
on the experiences of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Drawing on quantitative analysis, 
secondary data and interviews conducted with a range of firms and stakeholders, I argue that financial 
development in Vietnam has had positive effects in terms of increasing access to funding for SMEs. As 
the financial system has developed, allocative efficiency has improved to the benefit of SMEs. However, 
some informants criticised the progress made to date, arguing that a funding mismatch still exists. 
Specifically, weak corporate governance, state-owned enterprises and a lack of derivatives have 
prevented effective capital market development. Given Vietnam’s high level of political corruption, this 
paper concludes that policy makers must place more attention on the political-economic structures of 
Vietnam if achieving middle-income status is to occur. Specifically, a tighter and more controlled effort 
to dismantle corporate bureaucracy and nepotism would allow better access to funding for Vietnamese 
SMEs. 
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1. Introduction:  
In recent decades, the world’s economic centre of gravity has been shifting away from developed 
nations towards emerging economies in Africa, Asia and Latin America1. This holds particularly true 
in the capital markets where investors, starved of returns from their home markets and in a perennial 
hunt for yield, are beginning to rethink their exposure to emerging markets, through increased asset 
allocation. Given their ability to generate superior capital returns (MSCI Daily TR Emerging Markets 
Net USD index2, 2017), investors are increasingly looking to capitalise on favourable demographics, 
long-term corporate profit growth and improving returns on equity. At the same time, emerging 
economies constantly require injections of funding in order to fuel numerous expansion projects. As 
financial markets become increasingly globalised (Blundell-Wignall et al., 2018), many emerging 
market economies are faced with two key decisions. First, whether or not to liberalize their financial 
sector and develop market-based systems of capital allocation (as opposed state-based systems of 
capital allocation). And second, how to manage international investment flows. 
These decisions parallel the journey undertaken by Vietnam, a country widely recognised as a 
successful developmental state that has evolved from a deprived nation with severely high rates of 
poverty, to a lower-middle-income country within just three decades (World Bank, 2018). Vietnam’s 
remarkable transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented one has meant that many 
countries have begun to imitate its model of development, seeking to replicate the successes of Asia’s 
“next economic tiger” (Forbes, 2016). Today, Vietnam is enjoying exceptional economic performance, 
boasting 6.8% GDP growth in 2017 (World Bank, 2018), and is rapidly becoming a favoured destination 
for business – as new houses, factories and offices are undergoing construction (King, 2018). Many 
argue that much of this success is owed to liberal economic reforms that began in 1986, known as the 
“Doi Moi”, which captured the attention of the international financial community as “international 
investors saw Vietnam as a country ripe for entrepreneurial activity” (McCargo, 2004: 1). Yet, despite 
this progress, Vietnam is still at a very early stage of financial development and therefore hosts 
aggressive and volatile markets, meaning investors err on the side of caution. The result is a funding 
mismatch between what is required and what is available to fuel growth. 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in particular, which constitute 40% of GDP and 50% of 
the national workforce, face significant hurdles in raising funds as the country transitions into a 
                                                          
1 Emerging economies are low-income, high-growth countries which use financial development as their principal 
engine of growth. Most commonly, progress toward becoming an emerging economy is marked by increased 
liquidity in local debt and equity markets and the existence of some form of market exchange and regulatory body 
(Bekaert and Harvey, 2017).   
2 Over 70% of the MSCI Emerging Markets index country allocation is made up of China, South Korea, Taiwan, 
India and Brazil. While the remaining ~30% includes equities from Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Czech 
Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Qatar, Russian, South Africa, Turkey, UAE, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Saudi Arabia. 
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financially developed economy (Oxford Business Group, 2017). Indeed, while considerable headway 
has been made for the SME sector, accessing funding is the largest challenge faced by firms looking to 
expand business ventures (Pham and Talavera, 2018). Thus, going beyond the veil of Vietnam’s 
economic prosperity, this thesis therefore explores, on a more granular level, how reforms have affected 
the nature of capital allocation, with a focus on the experience of SMEs. While there is extensive 
literature on financial reform and evolving capital structures in emerging markets, there is a dearth of 
research on the experience of firms in these contexts. Given their important position in driving emerging 
market growth, understanding constraints to SME growth makes for an interesting research topic.  
1.1 Research Questions: 
To understand the impact of financial development in Vietnam since 1986, I will be guided by two 
overarching research questions:  
RQ1: How has financial development since 1986 changed the nature of capital allocation in Vietnam? 
RQ2: What have been the unique challenges faced by SMEs in the context of economic reforms? 
To answer these questions I combined secondary data with semi-structured interviews, to develop a 
picture of how reforms have changed the financial landscape in terms of global integration and the role 
of the state in allocating investment capital. My findings suggest that there are a number of barriers that 
SMEs face in accessing funding. First, poor corporate governance has served to undermine the 
reliability of financial statements and thus reduced the incentive for lenders to provide funding. 
Secondly, a lack of development in the derivatives market, and consequently a lack of liquidity, has 
meant that financial systems are not as advanced as Vietnam’s counterparts. Companies looking to raise 
finances through more complex derivative products are not able to.  
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 begins by situating my research questions in a 
theoretical framework, providing a brief summary of the debates in the literature. Specifically, I will 
attend to the arguments discussing financial development, using Levine (2005) as a rubric for 
understanding why a country might liberalise, before delving into sequential process of how economies 
develop. Alongside this, I introduce some of the empirical work done in this field of financial 
economics, synthesising econometric analysis to quantify the effects of financial development across 
multiple geographies. Finally, it traces the history of emerging economies that have undergone similar 
reforms in their financial system, framing the debate through examples where financial development 
has had both positive and negative effects. 
Section 3 explains the methodology and data collection techniques. Within this, I critically reflect the 
use of process tracing, through which I applied a three-pronged approach. This methodology involved 
a review of secondary literature and quantitative analysis in conjunction with interviews conducted in 
the field. 
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Section 4 provides a cross-sectional analysis of the financial development at key historical junctures in 
Vietnam, through using the data that I have collected. In this section, I re-examine how finance has 
become increasingly more liberalised and how rules, regulation and reform developed alongside 
Vietnam’s financial evolution. This paper hopes to add to the literature on financial development by 
providing a critical overview of Vietnam’s history. Finally, I address the types of reform required to 
further enhance capital market efficiency in Vietnam. I argue that applying a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach to financial development is an overly simplistic solution to a complex problem. Specifically, 
in the context of Vietnam, access to finance remains difficult due to the continued dominance of state-
owned entities. In order to truly understand the nature of capital allocation, therefore, one must analyse 
Vietnam’s process of financial development through a political-economic framework.   
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2. Financial Development and Growth in Emerging Markets: A review 
of theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence 
To establish the theoretical framework for this thesis’ analysis, this section presents the fundamental 
concepts of financial development in the literature, and emphasises specifics areas of focus for this 
paper. At surface level, financial development is understood as a strategic economic reform, 
encouraging private sector development, with the view of stimulating economic growth (World Bank, 
2013). Conventional definitions state that financial development is the reduction in the role of 
government in the economy, whereby responsibility shifts to the ‘invisible hand of the market’ (Smith, 
1776).3 However, underpinning this process of reform and liberalisation is the establishment of 
regulatory institutions, which seek to monitor and control financial governance (Svirydzenka, 2016)4. 
Most commonly, governments initiate financial sector reform in order to generate sustainable GDP 
growth, a stronger balance of payments, capital accumulation and higher inflows of foreign direct 
investment (Levine, 2005). Enhanced provision of financial services develops the market-based 
mechanisms, and consequently economic resources are allocated on the principles of efficiency (Levine, 
2005). While there is ample evidence to support the benefits of financial sector development, many 
argue that, in practice, financial development is often pursued narrowly in the form of financial 
liberalisation. Historic events such as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the Asian Financial Crisis 
(AFC), excellently delineate the differences between financial liberalisation and financial development, 
concurrently underlining why it is imperative to establish the necessary safeguards against the potential 
pitfalls of financial deregulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 It is worth noting that there is no universally accepted definition for financial liberalisation. Countries may 
choose to liberalise their financial sectors through a variety of different instruments. Post-1997 AFC, particular 
attention was given to capital account liberalisation (see Stiglitz, 2000). This project, therefore, focuses on the 
forms of financial liberalisation undertaken in Vietnam to date. This includes, deregulation of banks, relaxation 
of capital controls and enhanced provision of capital market services. 
4 There is no single pathway to financial liberalisation. Countries are unique. Therefore, individual countries 
must re-articulate a specific strategy of financial development that is tailored to their economy. This project 
looks beyond a ‘one size fits all’ policy, accounting for heterogeneity within geographic-financial structures. 
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2.1 Theoretical Perspectives on Financial Development 
Theoretical debates relating to the relationship between financial development and economic growth 
are well documented in the literature, as this complex realm of academia has warranted considerable 
attention. However, despite spirited debates among economic and political circles contributing to both 
sides of the literature, a consensus is yet to be found. The theoretical groundwork of the finance-growth 
nexus originates with Schumpeter (1911), who stated that finance enables businesses to invest in 
productive opportunities, leading to economic growth. This has evolved through time, with McKinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973) becoming pioneers in the late 20th Century. The McKinnon/Shaw school of 
thought writes that an overbearing government impedes economic growth5. While more recently, 
Levine and King’s work (1993) argues that financial intermediaries increase efficient allocation of 
resources through enhancing information in the market and reducing transaction costs, engendering a 
more productive economy. Through increased savings, mobilisation of finances and consequently 
investments en masse, financial development engenders economic growth. 
Classical liberal economists argue that financial development is a decisive part of economic growth 
(Boubakari, 2010). Following William Gladstone’s (1858) note that  “[f]inance is… the stomach of the 
country, from which all other organs take their tone” (quoted in Buchana, n.d.: 1), advocates argue that 
economic growth is expected to increase on the back of more efficient allocation and mobilisation of 
resources, benefitting both individual savers and businesses. Specifically, the intermediation of funds 
and enhanced efficiency of capital allocation facilitates development of long-run investment projects, 
boosting productivity (Chami, Fuellenkamp and Sharma, 2010). In short, financial development 
promotes economic growth. 
Schumpeter (1911) analysed this nexus between financial development and economic growth, arguing 
that financial institutions were instrumental for an economy’s ability to deliver prosperity (Goldsmith, 
1969). Financial intermediaries are able to leverage specialised expertise, connecting investors to 
innovative business opportunities, driving economic growth (Schumpeter, 1911). The core function of 
financial intermediaries is to act as “market makers”, utilising their comparative advantage of 
investment knowhow; enabling financial intermediaries to actively seek out inefficiencies and identify 
opportunities in the market, thereby allocating funds more effectively (Levine and Zervos, 1998). This 
view is bolstered by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), who argued that a repressed financial sector 
stalls economic growth – as it discourages savings and therefore investment. In this view, the financial 
                                                          
5 This essay understands economic growth as the increase in marginal productivity of capital, rather than the 
increase in physical capital accumulation (Jorgenson, 2005) 
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intermediary is unable to operate efficiently, stalling investment, thus stifling economic growth in both 
the short and long run6.  
Levine (2005) goes further by articulating five key benefits of financial development:  
(i) efficient allocation of capital investments; 
(ii) better corporate governance; 
(iii) more effective mitigation of risk; 
(iv) large scale mobilisation of saving and 
(v) greater exchange of goods and services. 
Each of these functions of finance serves to create a more productively efficient economy (Levine, 
2005, King and Levine, 1993). Of all of these, the three benefits of financial development that have 
attracted the most attention from researchers and policy makers are: more efficient allocation of scarce 
resources, enhanced corporate governance and the diversification of risk (Svirydzenka, 2015, IMF, 
2015). 
As financial intermediaries gain more presence within an economy, enhanced provision of information 
reduces asymmetries and consequently, investors develop a better level of market awareness (Levine, 
2005). Advances in information capabilities made available to the public provide savers with a diverse 
selection of investment opportunities – namely additional products on a larger scale (Bencivenga et al., 
1995). Sophisticated and technical knowhow combined with these additional products serve to create a 
diversified portfolio, which insulates investors from sudden market shocks (Levine, 2005) and as a 
result ensures that savings are less sensitive to volatile movements (Svirydzenka, 2015). In accordance 
with this theory, Havránek et al’s (2014) meta-analysis studied the relationship between development 
of the financial systems and long-run economic growth. Their conclusion implied a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between the development of the financial sector and economic 
growth.  
In addition, analysts that invest in financial markets are able to actively manage a diverse portfolio, 
regularly trading and hedging their investment positions. This investment style generates a “portfolio 
shift towards projects with higher returns” (Levine, 2005: 875), accelerating productivity growth. 
Consequently, pools of capital become insured or ‘hedged’ against negative demand shocks (Saint-
Paul, 1992), ameliorating previous risks and catering for a more stable economic environment (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2002). Many market watchers apply advanced techniques of risk 
management, such as Harry Markowitz’s Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) (1952), which employs a 
mathematical framework established to explain how investors can enhance the return-risk trade-off, 
                                                          
6 McKinnon’s (1973) main criticism in this instance is that a repressed financial sector yields lower returns on 
savings, which fall below that of inflation. This is a product of inefficient allocation of capital, which compromises 
the ability for businesses that are earnings accretive to survive. 
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through considering the variance of the underlying assets in conjunction with one another. 
Computations conducted through the variance-covariance matrix enable fund managers to derive and 
pursue superior level of returns, in comparison to fund managers who analyse the volatility of assets in 
isolation. The adoption of these quantitative risk-mitigation techniques therefore establish higher levels 
of investor confidence, stimulating higher levels of investment to more profitable businesses. Overall, 
this yields a greater efficiency in resource allocation, accelerating growth (Bencivenga and Smith, 
1991). 
Some economists go further to assert that financial development is necessary for growth, arguing that 
financial development provides a much needed source of funding, on a significantly greater scale 
(Levine and Zervos, 1998; Caporale, 2004). This perspective arises from the increased level of 
economic integration within the global financial system, which provides additional opportunities to 
raise funds (Aizenman et al., 2012). On a more granular level, stock and bond market development – 
the primary function of which is to raise equity and issue debt, respectively – becomes increasingly 
important for firms who wish to tap into global pools of savings (ACCA, 2012). Development of capital 
market services allow firms to access liquidity more easily. Emerging markets and developing 
economies are able to use global resources to fund longer-term, supply-side projects (Wurgler, 2000)7. 
This form of market making allows companies to experience more growth, more new jobs and an 
enhanced for provision of goods and services for the everyday consumer (Bencivenga and Smith., 
1995). Additionally, investors benefit from capital appreciation or from dividends/coupon payments, 
both of which incentivise further investment. By allocating funds to investments yielding the highest 
risk-adjusted returns, capital flows to the correct areas of the economy, i.e. where the most productive 
businesses are (Caporale, 2004).  
The view that financial development is necessary for economic growth takes its roots with economists 
who challenge Joan Robinson’s statement (1952:86) that “where enterprise leads, finance follows”. In 
addition to theoretical papers, several quantitative economists have sought to explain causality in 
financial development, that is, whether it is supply-leading or demand-following8. In order to test this 
relationship, Calderon and Lui’s (2003) study applies econometric modelling to the issue, concluding 
that there is a causal relationship from financial development to growth. Approximately 76% of 
developing countries exhibited a supply-leading relationship when using the ratio of private sector 
credit to GDP, compared to 45% for developed economies. This data implies that financial development 
                                                          
7Debt and equity markets become increasingly important in economies that have a struggling savings rate 
(Hamilton and Clemens, 1999). For Emerging Markets in particular, the development of the bond markets has 
been essential for raising corporate and sovereign debt. So much so, that across the first quarter of 2017, a 
record amount of EM syndicated borrowing was raised, totalling $417bn (Allen, 2018). 
8Supply-leading hypothesis suggests that financial development engenders economic growth, while demand-
following hypothesis argues that economic growth drives the need for financial services. For more literature 
surrounding the relationship of causality for financial development and economic growth, see: Robinson (1952), 
Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) and Hartmann et al. (2012). 
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has a larger effect on economic growth in less-developed economies – which is the focus of this 
dissertation.   
For Levine (2005) and Bencivenga et al. (1995) capital market liquidity is essential for the sustained 
funding of longer-term investment projects. Greater levels of liquidity allow investors to have easier 
opportunities for exit, as they can more easily sell their position – there is less risk9. For example, if 
there is a company that requires large-scale investment, and investors are looking to allocate their funds 
to the next big market opportunity – debt and equity markets harness the scale, the global network and 
the sophisticated level of technical knowledge to facilitate this process. This channelling of savings to 
businesses in a cheaper and more efficient way engenders economic growth10 (ACCA, 2012; 
Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). Therefore, stock markets enable firms to acquire finances through 
enhancing efficient capital allocation, long-term investment and productivity growth (Paudel, 2005). 
However, this strand of theory which argues that financial development enables finances to flow to 
areas that need it most has increasingly been called into question. For instance, Levine’s theory has 
been refuted by many academics who demonstrate that funding does not always flow from places of 
surplus to places of deficit, particularly when analysing empirical data of modern economies (Chinn 
and Ito, 2005). Extensive cross-country research11 shows that, despite greater provision of financial 
services and attractive rates of growth, the market mechanisms do not always operate under the 
principles of allocative efficiency. In fact, between 1990 and 2000, global capital flows did the opposite. 
Theoretically, financial markets should have facilitated capital flows into investment-starved emerging 
economies, yet flows were instead directed to credit-hungry US consumers (Schularick and Wachtel, 
2014). More recently, in the aftermath of the GFC, more investors have begun to pay closer attention 
to the risk-premium attached to investments, demanding exceptional return as compensation for higher 
risk, typical of emerging markets assets (Necker and Ziegelmeyer, 2013). This more cautious, “risk-
off” sentiment, combined with historical and empirical data indicates that funding does not flow to the 
areas that need it the most as purported in conventional theories, thereby challenging the orthodox view 
that financial markets enhance efficient capital allocation.  
Despite political, economic and public circles touting the benefits of financial development, most 
academics are sceptical of the narrow approach that is often taken: financial liberalisation. Specifically, 
sceptics focus on the absence of adequate financial sector policies and how they can have perverse 
                                                          
9 Enhanced market liquidity incentivises more actors to enter the market. Previously, long-term commitments to 
investing would have reduced the incentive – as there a lower likelihood that the investor will see it return 
(Boubakari, 2010). Buyers and sellers change positions more easily and thus enhanced liquidity increases the 
ability to invest. For key works on stock market liquidity see: Levine (1996), Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996) 
and Levine and Zervos (1996).  
10 Additionally, development of technology can have positive, long-term effects on boosting productivity growth 
through enhancing the quantity and quality of supply of goods and services. 
11 See In the Wake of the Crisis: Leading Economists Reassess Economic Policy (Blanchard, 2012).  
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economic outcomes. This line of thought is rooted in Keynes’ (1936) classic thesis, which argues that 
speculative activities and excessive capital mobility can have destabilizing effects on the economy, 
warranting increased supervision. Indeed, history has displayed both benefits and costs of financial 
liberalisation, concluding that financial reform needs to develop alongside multiple regulatory 
infrastructures to ensure stability (Kindleberger, 2015, Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995). Drawing on 
widespread financial liberalisation in the nineties, which triggered inflationary pressures, a weakened 
banking system and ultimately a financial crisis, Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) argue that a lack of 
regulatory oversight can create and exacerbate asset boom and bust cycles –deteriorating the overall 
health of the economy. Consequently, investors withdraw money supply from productive sectors of the 
economy and as a result the level of contagion becomes so severe that market liquidity evaporates, 
leading to “the disappearance of the finance effect” – challenging the theoretical rationale for reform 
(Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011). Financial liberalisation, isolated away from the development of 
rudimentary regulatory structures, tends to exaggerate a country’s vulnerability to economic shocks. 
Financial liberalisation and development, therefore, cannot be understood as mutually exclusive; a well-
constructed financial system requires both increased provision of financial products and a regulatory 
structure to underpin them. 
Stiglitz (2000) is critical of the idea that capital market liberalisation produces greater diversification of 
risk, stating that financial markets actually induce instability. The excessive mobility of capital serves 
to weaken financial markets, inducing fragility as investment rapidly flows in or out of the economy. 
Investors deposit or withdraw funding whenever an opportunity for profit presents itself or the potential 
of a capital loss occurs, respectively. Problems arise when large-scale movement of capital exacerbates 
market volatility, creating longer-lasting recessions (Agenor et al., 2006). When a country is perceived 
as an economic risk, investments become significantly less attractive and so banks, funds and 
institutional investors rapidly withdraw their capital in order to reduce their exposure and mitigate losses 
(Stiglitz, 2000). This quick removal of funding triggers uncertainty and an erosion of investor 
confidence, both internally and externally. Lenders’ perception of “emerging market risk” increases, 
subsequently leading to capital outflows en-masse12 (Dooley and Dooley, 1998). Academics have 
termed this short-term flow of funding in pursuit of profits as ‘hot money’, which can have detrimental 
effects for the exchange rate, aggregate demand and therefore employment (Fuertes, Phylaktis, Yan, 
2014). The overall effect is a decline of investment and decline in liquidity for that country, hampering 
economic growth. In recent years, surging levels of ‘hot money’ have begun to flow into emerging 
markets, destabilizing vulnerable economies (Shilling, 2018)13. In the long-run, it is not simply a 
                                                          
12 The process becomes a positive feedback loop, whereby the actions of other investors amplify the decisions of 
others, making the economy more fragile.  
13 Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan, Thailand and South Korea are among countries who have experienced these sudden 
injections and reversals of capital. As such, implementing regulation in order to control hot money had become 
central to future policy design (McCauley, 2010). 
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downturn that limits growth, but rather, impression of risk, instability and uncertainty that discourages 
future investment (Stiglitz, 1998). 
While theory states that financial liberalisation does have the potential to spread risk (i.e. through 
diversification and liquidity), unregulated investments can leave household savings exposed to market 
crashes (Rajan, 2006). In a deregulated, more competitive environment, investors become subject to 
increasing pressure to generate excess returns, entailing riskier investments (Stiglitz, 2000). Regulated 
industries, on the other hand, have specified limits of risk appetite or provide less incentive to “seek 
alpha”14. Historically, this increased freedom given to securities traders to invest ‘high-beta’, riskier 
securities15 has resulted in overleveraged investment portfolios and consequently a high exposure to 
financial loss. Specifically, Bhagat, Bolton and Lu’s study (2015) explains how a less regulated 
financial landscape is more conducive to greater levels of risk-taking and even becomes contagious. 
Moreover, Allen and Gale’s (2000) investigation finds that investment firms which reward performance 
related pay typically exhibit excessive risk, as returns that exceed expectations translate to a greater pay 
cheque. A short-term, “return-chasing” attitude creates incentives for financial institutions to pursue 
riskier investments to outperform rivals, or to please shareholders (Hellman et al., 2000). Problems, 
however, arise when companies become overleveraged, risk appetite becomes unsustainable and fraud 
becomes common practice. Financial development, if not done correctly, can have perverse outcomes 
for the global economy (Sahay et al., 2015). Without strong risk assessment or robust regulatory 
frameworks in place, financial intermediaries are free to raise their exposure and leverage beyond 
sustainable levels (Rossi, 1999). As a result, new bodies of literature have developed, underscoring the 
necessity of an established regulatory infrastructure for any financial system (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000; 
Keister, 2018). 
2.2 Forms of Finance and Firm Preferences 
As economies develop, and the need for greater levels of capital funding increases, new streams 
dictating flows of funding arise. Most commonly, market-based mechanisms or bank-based forms of 
financing are responsible for ensuring scarce resources flow to the most lucrative areas. Specifically, 
financial institutions, in the form of banks and capital markets, channel funds across the economy, 
allocating funds from areas of surplus to areas of deficit (Allen and Gale, 2000a). However, the relative 
importance of each form of finance differs across countries at different stages of development. This 
                                                          
14 Generating alpha is a technical financial term, given to measure performance on a risk-adjusted basis. It 
highlights the ability for an investment to beat the benchmark and generate excess return. Typically, it is these 
younger, more innovative firms, which are able to generate alpha, as they may be poised for huge amounts of 
growth. They are, however, less established and therefore bring with them additional amounts of risk. Due to no 
proven business model or record of sales, start-up businesses have a greater likelihood of failure.  
15 Risky investments conducted by financial intermediaries are often criticised by the public and the media for 
their ability to fuel financial crisis. Most famously, the 2007-08 GFC has been cited for the creation of mortgage-
backed securities consisting of sub-prime loans. 
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section provides a comparative analysis of the efficiency and reliability of banks and capital markets 
discussed in the literature.   
In a bank-based financial system, banks play a fundamental role in the pooling of savings, allocation of 
capital, corporate governance and management of risk (Vitols, 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2001). Although holding moderate importance in all countries, the importance of banks in the financial 
system varies significantly from country to country. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2010) found 
that, for emerging and developing markets in general, bank-based forms of financing dominate the 
landscape. Boyd and Smith’s paper (1996) corroborates these findings, explaining that smaller 
enterprises require smaller loans, which banks are well-positioned to provide. As such, capital markets 
become more desirable as an economy progresses along the development curve; the need for larger 
pools of funds goes hand in hand with a more established economy16.   
One orthodox argument, pioneered by Beck and Levine (2004), is that through having a greater risk 
appetite, stock markets further outperform banks by allocating funds towards more innovative 
investments. Conventionally, commercial banks17 are more conservative in their approach to capital 
allocation – preferring low-risk investments or “safe-haven” assets that generate consistent returns 
(Morck and Nakamura, 1999)18. Typically, however, it is these new and exciting technology start-ups 
that, if successful, yield the greatest returns – albeit at the additional expense of volatility and 
unpredictability. For example, Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu have been some of the best performing 
companies in recent years – achieving double-digit growth and rising from “start-up” status to 
technology giants with market leading positions in a matter of years (Moritz, 2018). However, in the 
initial stages of development, future cash flows for smaller companies are unpredictable, collateral is 
limited and consequently credit scores are lower. Banks, therefore, are more reluctant to lend as these 
firms fall outside of their accepted risk parameter, leaving these firms unable to access bank-based 
liquidity (Berger, 2002)19. Stock markets, on the other hand, have a more relaxed investment 
philosophy, as they seek to maximise capital growth (Wojcik, 2009). With a higher tolerance for risk, 
stock markets are more likely to invest in these innovative opportunities – providing a solution to the 
capital deficit. Overall, bank-based financial systems have a preference for allocating their assets to 
more developed, more mature firms. Meanwhile, their market counterparts focus on supporting these 
younger, higher yielding firms (Beck and Levine, 2004). In this way, market-based systems stimulate 
                                                          
16 For further reading covering the relationship between developed economies and market-based financial systems, 
and emerging economies and bank-based financial systems, see Singh and Hamid, 1992; Singh, 1995. 
17 It is important to delineate between commercial banks and investment banks. Commercial banks are 
principally focused on corporate lending via loans, while investments banks take on greater levels of risk 
through investing in the stock market.  
18 A safe haven asset maintains a consistent value during period of uncertainty or market volatility. Investors 
commonly allocate more capital into these assets during economic and/or market upsets. 
19 It is a common critique that start-ups struggle to achieve financing in bank-based financing, and is a core 
theme I wish to explore further in this dissertation. 
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growth in more innovative sectors of the economy, as they embody the risk-on sentiment required to 
finance such funding needs.  
Although famous for their ability to diversify and thus share risk, Allen and Gale (2001) illustrate how 
financial institutions in market-based structures typically allow for a greater proportion of their portfolio 
to contain “high-beta” (more risky) assets. This paradox challenges the theoretical groundwork 
supporting financial development, in which risk mitigation through diversification is a fundamental 
characteristic of any financial market. Yet, complex forms of risk mitigation and innovative ways of 
hedging allow investors to place ‘riskier’ trades, containing volatile price swings (Moyo, 2014). Bank-
based credit portfolios, on the other hand, typically employ a cross-sectional risk sharing strategy 
whereby investors hold only small amounts of one risk, typically through syndicated loan facilities 
(where two or more lenders agree to split the requested amount). The problem is that these strategies 
do not completely mitigate all macroeconomic shocks, but rather reduce the outstanding exposure 
(Allen and Gale, 2001). It is clear, therefore, that market-based systems have evolved to develop 
advanced methods of diversification and move away from more conventional risk mitigation strategies. 
Indeed, tailored, regulated and well-structured derivatives allow for advanced techniques of risk control 
(Merton, 1995)20. In this way, market-based economies allow for a higher risk tolerance and investment 
in riskier assets and business ventures. Meanwhile, advanced products allow for better risk 
management. Overall, this stimulates an environment more conducive to investment and growth.  
Conventional literature has argued that market-based economies call for enhanced transparency among 
firms. This argument takes its roots in the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which writes that stock markets 
allow for greater access to information meaning that “prices are accurate signals for capital allocation” 
(Fama, 1976: 133). In bank-based financial structures, there are less regulatory requirements to provide 
account disclosure (Levine, 1998). Public information is therefore limited, hindering the ability to make 
sound investment decisions. Conversely, the day-to-day trading of stocks and bonds via the capital 
markets, however, means that the fair price of assets are more accurately represented. Investors are 
more confident in investing their money, as the system is more operationally transparent meaning that 
they are aware of the risks. Therefore, the market mechanisms allow for greater efficiency, as they are 
more able to price assets on the bond and equity markets with greater transparency. Recent history, 
however, challenges this assertion. Academics often contend that whether it be because of unequal 
access to information, mis-selling of toxic products or behavioural finance, markets can never be truly 
efficient (Hamid et al. 2017). The GFC, the AFC and the Dot Com Bubble all highlight the extent to 
which unregulated capital markets are vulnerable to mispricing. 
                                                          
20 There are multiple derivatives products, each of which hope to mitigate risk. See J.P. Morgan (2013) for a 
more comprehensive overview of how different derivative products work. 
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Critics further challenge the efficient market hypothesis, stating that market-based systems are 
ineffective structures for allocating funds. For Llewellyn (1999), enhanced provision of information 
creates greater levels of volatility, resulting in hot money and asset price fluctuations. Stakeholders 
invested in price-sensitive assets are exposed to volatile market movements. Laffont and Maskin (1990) 
bolster this argument, highlighting how increased information actually reduces economic welfare as 
mispricing of securities engenders inconsistent returns of investments. Additional issues arise, as private 
information often serves to benefit insider traders, leaving uninformed investors to bear the 
consequences (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002). Specifically, those granted access to superior 
information exploit it, reorganising their portfolio investments accordingly – often at the expense others 
(Arun and Turner, 2002). Overall, there are a number of issues that arise as a result of information 
asymmetries which impact both retail and professional investors (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980).  
While banks and capital markets provide important sources of finance, pecking order theory writes that 
many firms prefer a capital structure based on internal finance rather than external finance (Myers, 
1984). For stakeholders in the company, there is an incentive to minimise external finance, to avoid 
capital market interference (Frank and Goyal, 2003). Publicly listed companies are often subject to 
intense scrutiny from the capital markets, leading to company valuations driven by market expectations, 
which often fail to forecast correctly. In this scenario, bank-based financing might be preferable to 
becoming publicly traded and being vulnerable to short-term market perception (Frank and Goyal, 
2003). If internal finance is not possible, firms prefer debt to equity (Barclay and Smith, 1999). This is 
because there are lower information costs involved when issuing debt, especially in comparison to 
equity. Moreover, the lending institution has no voting rights or executive decision making power. 
Ideally, however, firms try to avoid debt due to the negative balance sheet impact and potential for a 
credit rating re-evaluation. In the aftermath of the GFC, businesses are particularly cautious of taking 
on too much leverage, as this, combined with the potential for interest rate rises, can have dwindling 
effects on a firm’s financial position. Overall, pecking order theory argues that market-based financing 
is not preferable for firms. Companies hope to avoid drawbacks of interest rates or loss of company 
shares where possible.  
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2.3 From Financial Liberalisation to Financial Development 
The previous sections have shown that, while some economic commentators are favour of quick and 
extensive financial liberalisation, an emerging proposition among academics is that developing markets, 
in particular, are much better suited to a gradualist approach (Arun and Turner, 2002; Brunnermeier et 
al., 2017). This gradual approach towards financial development recognises that a legal and institutional 
framework is a necessary pre-requisite for any country undergoing a transition into a market-oriented 
economy (McKinnon, 1991). In accordance with this, international bodies such as the World Bank or 
the IMF have developed a set of strategic recommendations, enhancing regulatory, supervisory and 
accountancy practices to improve transparency within the institutional infrastructure (Ito, 2005). In 
order to ensure effective corporate governance, countries must establish a foundational legal system 
which enables a stronger financial system – less vulnerable to falsification of reports and corporate 
malfeasance (Prasad, 2010). Indeed a well-structured financial system goes part in parcel with stability 
and economic attractiveness, as investors take confidence in improved levels of corporate integrity. In 
short, financial markets operate better and deliver more sustainable returns when a reasonable level of 
regulatory and institutional oversight is established.  
In addition to establishing a regulatory framework governing corporate governance, the IMF 
recommends that strict and continual regulation of the money market via control and potential 
manipulation of interest rates, can prevent excessive leverage (Diamond and Dybvig, 1986). Indeed, as 
the flow and transmission of funds and credit through multiple channels is primarily determined by the 
monetary policy, such control and asset/activity restrictions are the principal means through which to 
regulate banks (International Monetary Fund, 2003). Interest rate ceilings, for instance, preclude banks 
from issuing loans to less creditworthy borrowers – streamlining their debtor book to only firms reliable 
enough to pay it back, while those who are more likely to default are excluded (Hellman et al., 2000). 
On the other hand, asset/activity restrictions impose rules on the types of risk money markets are 
allowed to engage in. Typically, these capital restrictions are placed on riskier activities – such as 
investment banking, securities trading and real-estate development projects. The core function for 
regulators when concerning banks, then, is to guarantee the safety of the depositor.  
For Healy and Palepu (2001), companies’ compliance through disclosure of information is imperative 
to maintaining high growth of the securities markets. Disclosure is defined as the sharing of firm-related 
information, allowing shareholders to make a more educated choice on whether or not to purchase 
ownership of that investment. Regulatory authorities are required to provide more transparency in 
financial and auditory accounts, as ensuring timely dissemination of accurate information of the 
company helps investors best allocate their resources, fostering market efficiency (Mohanty, 2002). 
Black (2001) states that robust rule of law on accounting and auditing standards boosts investor 
confidence, generating more trust in financial statements and therefore company performance. Indeed, 
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lack of transparency and therefore a weak regulatory framework signify a fragile and unstable financial 
system, vulnerable to fraud, misrepresentation and consequently market crashes (International 
Monetary Fund, 2003). 
Finally, given that one of the biggest issues challenging financial development is ‘hot money’, 
governments often make use of capital controls in order to manage and regulate international flows of 
funding. However, many economies struggle to find an equilibrium point, where they can reap the 
rewards of capital flows, whilst limiting adverse effects. For instance, in light of historic market crashes, 
emerging markets, in particular, exert caution over excessive cross-border capital flows. Academics 
commonly cite rapid fluctuations of mobile funding as a threat to emerging markets, challenging even 
those with strong economic fundamentals (Stiglitz, 1997). Thus, for those wishing to liberalise their 
capital account, IMF policy recommends a gradual reduction in capital controls, in order to provide 
freedom of exchange for local enterprise. It is important to establish strong macroeconomic and 
structural policies before the process of liberalisation is begun. In this case, regulating inflows and 
restricting outflows. Composition controls have become an increasingly popular way to prevent hot 
money, allowing countries to maintain commitment to a gradualist approach to financial liberalisation. 
In this regulatory set-up, due diligence is done on specific inflows, to prevent those of a riskier category 
(Ostry et al., 2012). Only specific types of capital inflow are encouraged – i.e. those that are in 
accordance with that country’s risk preference and financial sector stability. In this way, controlled and 
regulated development of international flows of funding is an attractive solution for emerging markets 
looking to develop a sustainable means of raising finances in a well-regulated environment (Ostry et 
al., 2010).  
In recent years, quantitative researchers have sought to highlight the importance of accounting 
standards, financial reporting and compliance in financial economics. Cross-country evidence indicates 
that transparency often leads to greater access to capital markets as well as lowering debt costs. The 
ACCA (2012) quantified a 1.1% growth in GDP for countries with above average standards, compared 
to a 0.04% for countries with below average standards. As asserted by Hammed (2005), countries 
exhibiting higher transparency enjoyed higher credit ratings and reduced levels of corruption. Lessons 
learnt from multiple financial crashes, as well as corporate scandals, underscore the importance of 
financial quality reporting and transparency in order to curtail fraud, promote corporate governance and 
maintain investor confidence (Kaufmann and Vishwanath, 2001). My empirical findings provide a more 
detailed analysis of the importance of accounting and auditing standards in emerging markets. 
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2.4 Financial Market Development in Emerging Markets 
Although financial development often improves the efficient allocation of capital within the economy, 
there is a wealth of literature which argues that, for emerging markets, this is not always the case. There 
are a number of challenges in developing more efficient financial system in emerging markets. First, 
critics cite the role of State-Owned Enterprises23 (SOEs) as a cause of inefficient capital allocation. 
Second, due to their lacklustre efforts to ensure effective regulatory systems have been established, 
financial development is susceptible to extreme market crashes.   
SOEs, broadly accepted as the dominant economic players in emerging markets, act as a significant 
barrier to SMEs in accessing finance24. The first barrier is that bureaucratic regimes deeply entrenched 
in the mechanisms of capital allocation undermine efficient market hypothesis, as SOEs are “first-in-
line” for funding irrespective of financial performance (Cull and Xu, 2003). The second criticism is 
that, because of their status in the political-economy, SOEs lack the incentive to invest and innovate. 
Therefore, productivity remains subdued and economic growth does not progress. 
The first barrier lends itself to the notion of “policy-lending”, which writes that banks operating in 
command economies allocate funding on the principal of State instruction, rather than their ability to 
service debt (Fries and Lane, 1994). In this scenario, political-historic legacy is deeply embedded within 
emerging markets’ financial framework and dictates the direction of capital flow. SOEs, therefore, have 
significantly greater access than other firms competing in the same space. For many emerging 
economies, policy lending is a defining characteristic of the financial structures, consequently saturating 
the market and leaving limited funds remaining for SMEs. Lou (1993), for example, found that loans 
used to finance the Chinese State Planning Commission’s projects, accounted for 67% of assets at the 
Bank of China in 1991. The problem with this, however, is that SOEs are more inefficient, as they do 
not operate under the principles of creative destruction and do not exist in a competitive market place. 
Credit, therefore, is allocated to less profitable ventures. Lardy’s study (1998) built on Lou’s analysis, 
highlighting how Chinese State-Owned Commercial Banks’ (SOCBs) return on assets fell from 1.4% 
to 0.3% between 1985 and 1994, as their credit portfolio became dominated by policy lending. The 
presence of SOEs in the economy, therefore, comes part in parcel with more inefficient allocation of 
capital.  
The second barrier is that because of their status in the economy, i.e. a vehicle for pursuit of state 
strategy, SOEs enjoy a high degree of monopolistic power (OECD, 2009). Whether this monopolistic 
power is derived from unfair government advantages such as subsidies, preferential regulatory 
                                                          
23 A state-owned enterprise can be defined as a business operating under governmental control (OECD 2009) 
24 This essay additionally recognises the importance of Family Conglomerates in emerging markets and their 
impact on SME is well documented in the literature (Kim, Danemir and Tamer-Cavusgil, 2004; Singh, Singh 
and Weisse, 2002; Drozdow & Carroll, 1997; Braun et al., 2018). However, this was a topic that did not emerge 
within my empirical data collection, and consequently, I have chosen to exclude them from the literature review. 
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treatment or information advantages (OECD, 2005; Capobianco and Christiansen, 2011; OECD, 2013), 
SMEs struggle to compete. In this position of business sovereignty – underpinned by established 
patterns of consumer spending, economies of scale and the continued support of the government – SOEs 
lack the incentive to invest or pursue research and development projects that would raise productivity. 
Therefore, when SOEs receive finance, funding is flowing to unproductive business ventures thereby 
stalling economic growth. 
In addition to a comprehensive analysis of the impact of SOEs in emerging market economies, it is 
useful to understand specific examples of financial development in emerging markets and investigate 
how the evolution of capital markets and the banking sector affects economic growth in these countries. 
Understanding the journey other emerging economies have undergone tells a story of how financial 
development operates in different geographies, providing more colour beyond a binary conclusion of 
whether the effects have been positive or negative. Tracing the financial histories of emerging 
economies helps to provide a rubric for understanding effective implementation of financial 
development. This short section, therefore, provides a brief overview of financial development in Chile 
and Malaysia, two countries which have reaped the rewards of such a transition.  
Chile is widely cited as a nation that has undergone radical financial transformation, ending years of 
economic repression in a short space of time. The adoption of more business-friendly economic policies 
meant that Chile was able to overcome chronic inflation, extreme levels of poverty and record levels of 
unemployment. Dubbed as the “Miracle of Chile” by Milton Friedman (1990), financial reform, drip 
fed in three rounds, was first initiated in 1974, as the government focused on developing a more market-
based economy. A combination of the removal of capital constraints, reduced controls over the banking 
sector and increased levels of privatisation (International Monetary Fund, 2015) meant that Chile’s 
annual growth of economic expansion between 1986 and 2005 averaged at 4.8%, outpacing the rest of 
their Latin American neighbours (Schmidt-Hebbel, 2006). Much of the success is owed in particular to 
the development of the capital markets, which boomed in the aftermath of the 1982/84 banking crisis. 
The IMF (2015) explains how increased sources of funding meant that firms across different industries 
and of different sizes could now pursue expansion projects. To date, Chile has benefited from such 
reforms, boasting the 48th highest nominal GDP per capita (US$18,296) globally (World Bank, 2018) 
as well as being recognised as South America’s most stable and prosperous nation. Moreover, the 
domestic bond market remains a chief source of credit, accounting for 40% of GDP (IMF, 2015). 
Overall, Chile’s commitment to financial services reform has seen funds flow to the most productive 
sectors of the economy, ultimately stimulating growth. 
Another nation frequently heralded as an economic success is Malaysia, which underwent significant 
stock market liberalisation and economic reform, reinventing an economy once based on mining and 
agriculture. In a desire to imitate the four Asian Tiger economies, the Malaysian government, in 1978, 
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initiated financial reforms in order to host a more attractive environment for entrepreneurship (IMF, 
2015). Changes implemented included deregulation of interest rates, a more globalised outlook on trade 
and removal of FDI restrictions. Many state that these reforms had positive effects, engendering growth 
rates consistently above 8.5% (IMF, 2016). For Ang and McKibbin (2007), the most notable effect of 
the financial sector reforms was financial deepening. The depth of the financial market catered for 
stronger macroeconomic stability, preventing capital account shocks. Moreover, since the AFC, there 
has been a consolidated effort to search for alternative sources of debt, as critics stated that Malaysia 
was over-reliant on foreign capital inflows (IMF, 2016). Thus, Malaysia’s focus has been to allow both 
the banking and non-banking sector prosper by creating a strong and resilient financial system, whereby 
bond markets have become an integral source of financing (IMF, 2015).  The bond market has doubled 
in size over the past ten years, as it has become recognised as the “hallmark of financial deepening 
[acting as a liquidity buffer] against external shocks” (IMF, 2015: 20), accounting for 71 percent of 
GDP (IMF, 2015).  
2.5 The Asian Financial Crisis 
While Malaysia and Chile are often cited for their ability to engender economic growth on the back of 
effective financial reform, the AFC provides additional context to financial development in emerging 
markets. The process of economic meltdown and subsequent of collapse are crucial to understanding 
more of the debates surrounding financial development (Hunter, Kaufman and Kreuger, 2012). 
Although the AFC is largely a result of the government floating the Thai Baht, commentators argue that 
an unregulated financial system was largely accountable for the market crash (Goldstein, 1998). Thus, 
lessons learned as a result can provide valuable information for future policy recommendations. 
Liberalised financial markets in Asian economies meant that firms borrowed money with unprecedented 
records and financial intermediaries failed to conduct diligent background checks. As a result, financial 
institutions allocated credit to firms that were already suffering from a heavy debt burden (Ariff and 
Khalid, 2000). As financial firms were in competition with one another, an incentive to generate the 
highest returns meant that 95% of short-term loans were lent to businesses with notoriously bad credit 
ratings (Krugman, 1999). 
Many of these non-performing loans with a high likelihood of credit default were a result of poor risk 
management (Mishkin, 1999). There was no regulatory structure in place to effectively monitor the 
riskier loans and consequently a financial crash ensued. Domestic firms placed too much reliance on 
the government, as personal relationships between government and businesses meant that banks and 
lending institutions did not have to bear the costs of credit default (Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick, 1999). 
Instead, financial intermediaries relied on the government as an insurance policy, believing that they 
would finance their operations in the event of a credit crunch. 
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Rapid withdraws of funds further exacerbated the AFC as investors pulled their assets from previously 
prospective Asian economies. As the financial system began to crash, the market panicked and 
withdrew capital, in fear of an economic collapse (Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1999). Consequently, 
the foreign exchange market became flooded with an excess supply of Asian currencies, depressing the 
value of their exchange rates to record levels. A lack of investment in Asian economies coupled with 
high amounts of foreign debt meant each economy went bankrupt (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009). The 
short-term impacts were surging unemployment, falling levels of productivity, stagnant growth and a 
mass exodus of investment. The widespread population additionally felt long-term impacts, as the 
government reduced subsidies to education and healthcare. In the long-run, lower literacy rates also 
ensued, and the ability to generate a productive workforce staggered.  
Post-1997, academic commentators and policymakers alike have begun to stress the importance of 
financial systems and regulatory regimes, in order to mitigate the potential pitfalls of finance 
(Mathieson, Richards and Sharma, 1998). Specifically, the introduction of institutions and policies in 
order to prevent the associated dangers of financial liberalisation. As a corollary, policy prescriptions 
in emerging markets have been centralised on stricter financial regulation, whether it be through 
increased transparency or supervisory controls (Volz, 2012). As policymakers seek to address the 
optimal path for sequential liberalisation, new bodies of literature have emerged, detailing the specifics 
of sequential financial development (Pomfret, 2005).   
Overall, while the literature remains divided on the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth, with quantitative papers not serving to draw a close to the debate, the balance is tilted 
in favour financial development. Through increasing the amount of funding available and distributing 
it in a more efficient manner, financial services have the potential bolster the private sector and 
contribute to GDP growth. However, too often, economies have liberalised their financial sector too 
quickly, without establishing the correct forms of corporate governance. As history has shown, this can 
have a negative impact on the wider economy. This paper, therefore, underlines the importance of 
pursuing financial development in its entirety, rather than financial liberalisation in isolation.  
2.6 Interrogating Financial Development in the Context of Vietnam 
Overall, there is a general consensus in the literature that it is preferable for emerging economies to 
diversify investment channels. As firms of multiple sizes require different funding needs, it is important 
to develop both capital markets and bank-based forms of finance. As economies embark on a journey 
of financial development, new institutions arise that enable liquidity, efficient allocation of resources 
and ultimately growth. However, it is important to note that countries must adopt financial development 
in its entirety, as opposed to pursuing financial liberalisation in isolation. That is, reforming the financial 
economy alongside the establishment of comprehensive systems of regulation and effective rule of law. 
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Notably, the literature writes that countries must not apply a shortcut to the process, as history provides 
a series of valuable lessons whereby big bang approaches have backfired.  
The classical arguments that financial development engenders economic growth discussed in the 
literature review has underpinned much of Vietnam’s development approach. Indeed, its state-led 
development model has been a success in the decades following the Doi Moi. Drawing on this 
understanding of financial market development, this thesis will examine Vietnam through the lens of 
SMEs access to funding, which remains the biggest challenge to achieving middle-income status. 
Despite accounting for 77% of Vietnam’s labour force in 2012, recent research indicates that 
approximately 30% of Vietnam’s SMEs could not access funding from formal financial institutions 
(Nguyen et al., 2015). 
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3.  Methodology 
In order to explore how financial development since 1986 has changed the nature of funding allocation 
in Vietnam, and what some of the current challenges faced by SMEs are, I employed a process tracing 
research methodology. The primary benefit of this technique is that it provides a means of exploring 
the multiple causal dynamics involved in producing an outcome of a specific historical case (Beach, 
2017). In this case, it offers a granular perspective of the forces that underpin the finance-growth nexus 
in Vietnam. As part of this process tracing methodology I leveraged a three-pronged approach involving 
a synthesis of secondary literature, financial data and interviews conducted in the field.  
This methodology adds to each layer of analysis, catering for the required depth as well as context to 
gain insight into the potential mechanisms that link economic growth and financial development 
together; providing detail on how they intersect with SME growth in the dimension of more efficient 
capital allocation. The complimentary use of these three core components enabled deeper analysis of 
the multiple aspects of this financial-economic dilemma, thereby allowing me to collectively piece 
together the individual signals necessary to address the research question of this paper. This was 
achieved by blending quantitative and qualitative analysis, employing time-series financial data from a 
number of sources, primarily the World Bank, the State Bank of Vietnam and the General Statistics 
Office and interviews conducted in the field. 
The results of this quantitative analysis provide indices of macroeconomic development, to depict the 
extent to which the Vietnamese economy has benefited from financial development, with an emphasis 
on how the nature of funding allocation has changed overtime. The trends of the following are studied: 
GDP growth, productivity, balance of payments, availability of credit, privatisation and foreign direct 
investment. The rationale for using these variables for quantitative analysis is twofold. First, they are 
widely accepted, across the literature, as key indicators of economic growth in emerging economies and 
in particular, Vietnam (Anwar and Nguyen, 2011; Bayar, 2014). Second, given that these variables have 
been frequently incorporated in past analysis, using them in this thesis ensures data consistency, 
enabling future research to incorporate my empirical results. Moreover, previous analysis conducted by 
Anwar and Nguyen (2011) made use of panel data over a period of 1997-2006. This research, therefore, 
provides an up to date analysis of economic growth situated in the context of the empirical evidence 
discussed in the literature review.  
I carried out 13 semi-structured interviews with financial analysts, think tank staff, business owners and 
a Vietnamese academic between February and March 2017 (see Table 1). Each interview lasted between 
20 minutes and 1 hour. Interviewees expressed distinctly different views on what financial liberalisation 
over the past two decades has meant for the nature and geography of funding allocation in Vietnam. 
Through conducting interviews with a diverse group of interviewees, this allowed for heterogeneity, 
which added to the richness of my project, giving a broader conceptual and theoretical foundation for 
 
 
22 
 
the economic-geographical framework. Interviews began with a few key questions, with the intention 
of teasing out more detailed and more informative answers, as well enabling participants to elaborate 
on specific areas they felt important. Further interviews arose as a result of initial discussions, as 
informants introduced me to a network of willing research participants.  
Table 1: Details of respondents for interviews 
Before critically reflecting on interviews as a methodology, it is important to note the context of 
Vietnam as a “police-state” and therefore understand the way in which this affected how data was 
collected. Indeed, due to the level of corruption and overbearing nature of the State, research 
participants in Vietnam tend to be cautious. As such, networks and relationships must be forged prior 
to engaging in sensitive discussion (Hoang and Yi, 2015). In this way, I conducted social research that 
was participatory and built on a pre-existing relationship (Westbrook, 1995). An essential part of the 
project, therefore, was to follow Kindon et al’s (2010) recommendations, to network with a number of 
individuals in Vietnam, explaining the purpose of the project and some of the findings in the literature. 
Prior to arriving in Vietnam, interviews were arranged with primarily universities, to work on the project 
collaboratively and gain as much high-level insight as possible. After having worked with both students 
and professors, I was introduced to business owners, financial professionals and market watchers. It 
became clear that relationship building and networking was an essential part of the research project. As 
more people were met, more business cards and contacts were shared, leading to more interviews that 
were rich in content.  
Respondent Code Nationality Date (2017) 
Business Owner #1 BO1 Vietnamese 23rd February 
Business Owner #2 BO1 Vietnamese 25th February 
Business Owner #3 BO1 Vietnamese 6th March 
Business Owner #4 BO1 Vietnamese 10th March 
Financial Analyst #1 FA1 British 20th February 
Financial Analyst #2 FA2 American 27th February 
Financial Analyst #3 FA3 Vietnamese 2nd March  
Financial Analyst #4 FA4 Vietnamese 4th March  
Financial Analyst #5 FA5 Vietnamese 6th March 
University 1 U1 Vietnamese 21st February 
Think Tank 1 TT1 Australian/British 27th February 
Think Tank 2 TT2 Vietnamese 24th February 
Think Tank 3 TT3 Australian 12th March  
Table 1: Details of respondents for interviews 
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3.1 Reflection 
I primarily interviewed individuals in elite positions of society, loosely defined as those holding a status 
of power (Lilleker, 2003). Close dialogue, through semi-structured interviews, was particularly useful, 
as it allowed informants to describe in detail the intricacies of financial development within Vietnam. 
It became apparent that not all of the views on financial development were consistent with one another. 
Rather, they were contextually unique; defining the concept of financial development alone is difficult. 
Moreover, the ways in which companies seek to benefit from enhanced financial systems is inherently 
unique. Different businesses may be better suited to more traditional forms of lending, while others saw 
modernisation as an opportunity to access funding that was not previously available. For that reason, 
interviews were more applicable than surveys. Detailed and descriptive one-to-one projects were 
essential for understanding the multiplicity of viewpoints surrounding financial development. For 
Greenwich Associates (1996), close dialogue is particularly useful in documenting investment patterns 
and market behaviour, precisely the information this project was interested in. Secondly, I wanted to 
make use of a method that recognised the geographical diversity of spatial-economic systems (Martin 
and Sunley, 1996), attending to Krugman’s argument (1991) that “stylized facts may impoverish 
theoretical innovation in economic geography” (quoted in Clark, 1998: 73). In this respect, I adopted a 
similar approach to Gerler (1996, 1993), exploiting close dialogue with industry elites in order to 
understand the fine-grained, substantive dynamism of the Vietnamese financial system (Geertz, 1983). 
Finally, financial liberalisation is contextually specific. Thus, this method was chosen in order to build 
a detailed case study from the knowledge of others and deeper concerns and interests than the ready-
made world (Clark, 1998 and Bourdieu, 1990), explaining more important endogenous growth26 
(Romer, 1994) in Vietnam over the last two decades. 
Another benefit of semi-structured interviews was that while the guideline questions had a relatively 
fixed structure, they were open-ended and thus conducive to depth. I was able to probe answers and 
perceptions pertaining to my review of the literature (Healy and Rawlinson, 1993). The main reason for 
this was that elites “prefer to articulate their views without being put in the straitjacket of close-ended 
questions” (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002: 674). This helped to provide richer, more critical analysis. 
The additional benefit was that, because financial development is inherently complex open-ended 
questions allowed for an exploration of multiple factors (Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2006). The importance 
of perception interviews therefore quickly became a bibliography of personal stories, each informant 
explaining specifically how their experiences shaped their perceptions of financial liberalisation. 
Heterogeneity was particularly important here as each individual discussed ideas from different 
perspectives. As business owners, some talked about how financial liberalisation had directly affected 
their business. Portfolio managers and market traders talked about how the stock market had evolved 
with financial liberalisation. Political thinkers spoke from an ideological point of view, explaining the 
                                                          
26The idea that economic growth a result of investment in human capital and innovation. 
 
 
24 
 
importance of retaining state power. Differing perspectives were particularly important for 
understanding the political-economic framework through which financial development operates in 
Vietnam – discussed at the end of chapter 4.  
Although initially set on finding out general information for the wider economy, these stories became 
essential to the project, as they revealed processes of Vietnam’s financial liberalisation and development 
that were unique. Specific stories of how financial liberalisation affected different sectors, different 
business models and those in different geographies were ideas not found among the literature. These 
examples surpassed beyond ideas and theories radically different from what this project envisioned and 
what current literature does not conceive. An additional benefit of these stories, and a common critique 
within the literature, is that, as Piore (1979) notes, too often interviewees lose interest in answering 
questions that are not specific to them. By tailoring questions to the respondents’ anecdotes and being 
flexible in my approach, I was able to engage with the participant on a more personal level and therefore 
collect information that is more comparable and analyse it accordingly.  
Given the role of elite’s in society, obtaining access was difficult. There were unequal socio-spatial 
power relations at play. Thus, the first challenge to my methodology was organising the interviews.  As 
such, the project took heed of Harvey’s (2010) recommendations, which emphasises the importance of 
leveraging social networks to organise future interviews. Coming from a position of importance, elites 
often lack the incentive to devote time to research (Ostrander, 1993). This became particularly 
problematic for data collection, given the importance of perception and individual experiences in 
financial development. In order to overcome this barrier to data collection, I established a rapport with 
participants prior to arriving in Vietnam. Informants understood the details of the project prior to 
interviews. Respondents received emails, explaining the collaborative nature of the project as well as 
emphasising the mutual benefit of the paper in order to incentivise participation (Morris, 2009). In light 
of this, I adopted Homan’s (1991) recommendations, to “flatter the prospective interviewee by 
emphasising that his or her input would be beneficial to [the] research” (Homan, 1991).    
The second challenge is also an issue of power; as junior researchers are often unequipped to interview 
elites, and should avoid needlessly taking up their time (Dexter, 1964). The main issues were two-fold. 
Firstly, this project conducted research in Vietnam – an unfamiliar environment with which I had no 
experience in. Interviewing “elite members of society” (Bygnes, 2010: 6) in a new geographic space 
serves to reinforce the uneven power dialectic, as the researcher is inevitably the ‘novice’ (Smith, 2006). 
In this context, the researcher earns an ‘insider/outsider’ status, which can influence the interviewees’ 
responses (Herod, 1999). Secondly, financial systems are complex and require a substantial amount of 
knowledge, particularly as advanced products or terminology were introduced to the conversation. 
Thus, the researcher must hold an extensive knowledge on particular topics, becoming an ‘expert’ on 
the subject (Harvey, 2011) and move beyond this powerless status to challenge elites (Ostrander, 1995). 
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This prevents a loss of information, as enhanced knowledge allows for more intense debate and thus 
richer data. A further criticism of uneven power relations is that interviewees tend to seek control of the 
interview (Burnham et al., 2004). In order to address these power relations, broad research was 
conducted on financial development in emerging economies in general, whilst additionally learning 
about the specifics of Vietnam. This enabled me to talk at length on multiple topics, as well as on 
contradicting opinions surrounding Vietnam’s financial history. 
The final criticism involves the positionality of the researcher and respondents and the potential of 
subjective dishonesty, as elites will agree to an interview in order to express particular points of view 
(Ball, 1994). It is common for elites to deflect, avoid or re-articulate the questions asked, rather than 
directly addressing the question27 (Batteson and Ball, 1995). Indeed, for Goffman (1959), interviewing 
elites is performative, whereby informants tailor responses to convey specific arguments. In this way, 
information obtained is distorted and selectively chosen, resulting in an information bias towards a 
particular viewpoint. However, the interviewer must maintain a neutral position and respect the 
information provided. In order to mitigate this issue, the researcher is required to be pragmatic in their 
approach. Different researchers apply different approaches to dealing with subjective accounts of 
research material. For Richards (1996), the interviewer can cite previous interviews, to fuel discussion, 
show off knowledge and draw patterns that emerge from the qualitative research. Leech (2002), 
however, advises the opposite. Revealing information from previous interviews shows a lack of 
commitment to confidentiality. Interpretation of interview material, therefore, strived to be open and 
uninfluenced by prior knowledge. The project aimed to listen to multiple perceptions and explanations.    
3.2 Secondary Data 
The literature review showed that most time-series analysis of the effect financial development on 
growth returned a positive relationship. Meanwhile cross-sectional analysis integrated into my 
empirical work found the same. Although application of empirical and quantitative analysis was based 
on extensive sets of data, these results can be called into question through critically evaluating the 
reliability of these data sources and potential for outliers (Thorne, 2000). This challenge resonates 
particularly strongly with researchers studying emerging markets, as structural deficiencies mean that 
there are significant data gaps, biased data and quite often falsified numbers (Bekaert and Harvey, 
2002). 
In my empirical findings, the majority of data used was collected from the World Bank, the Office for 
National Statistics and the IMF. While all of these are well-established, reputable sources for data – one 
must reflect on the positionality in order to understand what might be reliable and what may be impacted 
by bias. It is important to note that macroeconomic data – particularly of the size and scale used in this 
                                                          
27 This holds particularly true for political and economic elites, who have a desire to express strong opinions – 
emphasising examples that support their beliefs and downplaying narratives that conflict with theirs. 
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dissertation – is vulnerable to distortion (Rosenberg and Goodwin, 2016). The data used in this 
investigation has been created by market watchers who aggregate large amounts of statistics and 
therefore, there is a potential for results that may be inconsistent to the wider dataset. Financial time 
series data, for example, may often showcase irregular data points due to erroneous inputs, thereby 
reducing the effectiveness of the analysis (Bekaert and Harvey, 2002). Additionally, unrecorded flows 
of finance and occasions where transactions have been unaudited serve to erode the validity of such 
data – a key concern for countries like Vietnam who persistently score poorly on the integrity index. 
There is, therefore, a significant limitation to using secondary data, as researchers are not provided with 
a completely transparent set of data. However, as already noted, this analysis leveraged quantitative 
analysis from well-respected, global institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, each of which 
make a concerted effort to ensure that their data collection is guided by professionalism and integrity 
(World Bank, 2018). While the data used might not be able to provide researchers with the complete 
picture down to the finest detail, the data used originates from a number of well-respected institutions.  
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4. Financial Development in Vietnam 
This section dissects Vietnam’s journey of economic reform through an analysis of its financial 
development timeline, critically evaluating key policy initiatives implemented. Critical historical 
junctures have been categorised based on changes in the government’s ideological perspectives and 
subsequent analysis of the effects of key initiatives in the following periods: 
 Doi Moi and Entrepreneurial Policy (1986-1994) 
 International Integration and Market Economy (1995-1999) 
 Development of Capital Markets and Increased Globalisation (2000-2007) 
 Modernisation of the Financial Economy (2007-Present) 
Timeline 1 offers a framework for the rest of the chapter, as key historical conjunctures create a structure 
for the direction for the narrative. The empirical analysis begins with the Doi Moi, as this marks the 
beginning of Vietnam’s economic liberalisation. At each historical conjuncture I analyse the impact 
reform had on SMEs in Vietnam. The underlying aim of this section is to identify how the nature of 
capital allocation has changed, with specific focus on how firms in Vietnam raise funds. In doing a 
temporal analysis, I explore the multiple themes that have evolved alongside Vietnam’s gradualist 
development.  
However, it is useful to situate this narrative in the wider historical context. Following independence 
from French colonists, the Vietnamese government made use of recentralised economic management 
(Beresford, 2008). Control over enterprise guided the population away from capitalist ventures and 
allocated resources in a way they thought best for society. Although not a complete copy of the Soviet 
model, Vietnam implemented a similar economic system, based upon the principles of collectivisation 
and physical output targeting (Leung, 2009). Vietnam was a closed-off agrarian-based export economy, 
and the Vietnamese State governed the majority of enterprise up until the mid-1980s.  
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s business model, however, came under intense pressure as 
economic isolation resulted in a failure of the authorities to manage factor inputs effectively. The means 
of the State did not allow for a rational pricing structure, and therefore could not allocate resources 
efficiently (Irvin, 1995). Hard-reform socialism, which took place in 1981, attempted to re-centralise 
economic management and correct said inefficiencies. The result of this however, was a substantial 
state budget deficit and hyperinflation, as decisions by government to print money exacerbated the 
underlying problems (Painter, 2005).  
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 Born out of the result of socio-economic crisis, 
the Doi Moi reforms illustrate a movement 
away from a centrally planned economy to a 
socialist oriented market economy.  
 Vietnam implemented a centrally planned 
economy controlling the supply and demand of 
goods and services. Without the support from 
private sector, Vietnam economy had 
experienced a recession for a long time 
alongside an undeveloped financial market: the 
banking system was 1-tier, no stock market, no 
investment funds. 
 The State acknowledged a multi-sector 
economy including the private ownership of 
production materials and properties. The 
government eliminated state subsidies for and 
equitized the inefficient SOEs encouraged the 
private ownership and investment in 
production. 
 The result of the economic reforms was 30,000 
new businesses, annual GDP growth of 7.3%, 
export market growth of ~20% and more 
foreign firms investing in Vietnam. 
 Establishment of the Ho Chi Minh (2000) and 
Hanoi (2005) Stock Exchanges as an 
alternative mode of capital raising.  
 In order to restrict monopolistic control from 
foreign entities, investors were limited to 20% 
foreign ownership of equities and 40% for 
bonds. However this has moved up to 49% 
over recent years.  
 Regulated by the SSC (but not enough to instil 
confidence in investors). 
 A number of SMEs have gone public, listing 
their stock on the capital markets.  
 The government has offered tax to companies 
who list their stock, in order to fuel the 
development of capital markets. 
 Despite optimistic growth for the stock and 
bond markets very encouraging but a long way 
to go. Most specifically, establishing a 
comprehensive regulatory framework through 
which companies operate in. 
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 The Law on Foreign investment is centralised 
on cooperating with foreign countries in order 
to support the cause of modernisation, 
industrialisation and development of the 
national economy. 
 Over the next couple of years, Vietnam 
attracted significant FDI which is attributed to 
promulgation of a liberal FIL. FDI inflow 
increased from $0.32billion to $9billion 1988-
1996 ^ 28% YOY.  
 FDI become particularly important for 
employment growth, industrial output and 
more recently in providing investment capital 
and stimulating export growth. 
 Overtime, revisions have been made to the Law 
on Foreign Investment, reducing red tape and 
bringing corporate governance closer to 
international standards. 
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increased from $0.32billion to $9billion 1988-
 Transition from a single-tier banking system 
where the SBV controlled all domestic banking 
services. State-owned banks had complete 
control on what went on in the economy. Doi 
Moi implemented under the realisation that 
banking sector was uncompetitive and was 
constraining private enterprise and therefore 
economic growth. Split into two tiers, with the 
SBV as the central bank but also four 
specialised SOCBs which were still owned by 
the State but run commercially.  
 Functions of central banks and commercial 
banks were separated. Alongside this, new 
banking laws and regulations have encouraged 
the growth of the sector and have channelled 
more capital, stimulating economic growth. 
 The government eliminated state subsidies for 
and equitized the inefficient SOEs, encouraged 
the private ownership and investment in 
production. Majority of bank credit still to state 
sector (rising from 1% in 1991 to 10% in 1997). 
At this point in time, only 4 SOCBs and a small 
number of credit cooperatives until 1990. This 
number, however, grew to over 60 banks in 
1994. 
 
1986: Doi Moi Reforms
1987-1988 Decision No. 218/CT 
& No. 53/ND
1987: Law on Foreign 
Investment
1990-2012: International Integration
2000 & 2005: Capital Markets
2005: Law on Enterprise 
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UPCoM 
 WTO Membership and US Bilateral Trade 
Agree ent 
 The BTA provided for "normal trade relations" 
(NTR) status of Vietnamese goods in the U.S. 
market. It was expected that access to the U.S. 
market would allow Vietnam to hasten its 
transformation into a manufacturing-
based, export-oriented economy. Furthermore, 
it would attract foreign investment, not only 
from the U.S., but also from Europe, Asia and 
other regions. 
 Tra e deals and membership of the WTO gave 
Vietnamese exporters access to numerous 
foreign markets.  
 Protected industries, however, have had to face 
significant reform in order to remain 
competitive. For example, domestic banks 
were put up against foreign competition, 
squeezing their profit margins. 
 WTO membership has also meant that Vietnam 
is equired to comply with a unified regulatory 
framework, bolstering investment appetite for 
Vietnam. 
 
 
 Introduced in order to encourage foreign investors to 
allocate their capital ithin Vietnam, facilitating growth 
foreign business growth. The Enterprise Law enables 
businesses to register before being accepted by the 
government (Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006). As a 
result, entrepreneurial activity, characterised by private 
firm registration, doubled in volume in 1999 when 
compared to previous years.  
 The Law on Enterprise allowed for a common legal 
framework among all firms in Vietnam. It created a more 
levelled-playing field for private sector and public sector. 
 Movement to a more prosperous job market and effective 
regulation has resonated strongly among business owners 
who have no doubt enjoyed these radical changes (World 
Bank, 2016). Weak implementation of the enterprise law 
has resulted in many business licenses being revoked, thus 
stalling growth. 
 
 
 Introduced in order to encourage foreign investors to 
allocate their capital within Vietnam, facilitating growth 
foreign business growth. The Enterprise Law enables 
businesses to register before being accepted by the 
government (Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006). As a 
result, entrepreneurial activity, characterised by private 
 UPCoM is an OTC market for companies that want 
to go public but not list.  
 Increasing numbers of SOEs are beginning to use 
UPCoM as a platform for equitisation, following 
pressure from the government to sell off inefficient 
entities. Under this plan, nearly 500 SOEs equitized 
between 2016 and 2017.  Big names such as 
MobiFone, Satra, Benthanh Group, Viet Nam Tea are 
beginning to list on UPCoM 
 Perhaps the main drawback of the OTC markets is 
the lack of transparency. While these markets 
function well during periods of growth, poor 
regulation can cause a vicious circle to develop 
during times of financial stress. 
 Given the growth of UPCoM, the government as 
given considerable effort to ensure regulation is up-
to-date. This is in the hope that more investors will 
look to hold capital in Vietnam and that more firms 
will join the market, expanding as they do so.  
 To trade on UPCoM, companies need only meet 
simple conditions, like charter capital of over 
VND10 billion ($448,200) and more than 100 
investors. 
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Core Focus on the Vietnamese Market Economy: 
1. Reform SOEs to allow private enterprise to flourish 
2. Give private business more freedom and access to credit 
3. Price and trade liberalisation 
 
 
Timeline 1: A Timeline of 
Vietnam's Financial Development 
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4.1 1986-1994: Doi Moi & Entrepreneurial Policy 
After decades of acute economic hardship and crisis, the Socialist model became unpopular. Pressure 
from technocrats and those in favour of market reform forced a revaluation of traditional socialist 
ideologies and capital structures. What emerged was a vision of a hybrid economic model combining 
elements of socialism but integrating market mechanisms, such as opening up to international trade and 
investment, establishing laws on private business and introducing property rights (Vuving, 2012). 
Overall, by liberating the markets, Vietnam would correct persistent market inefficiencies and generate 
a more productive economy (Che et al., 2002). 
This new approach was reflected in Decree 217/1987/HBDT, which dismantled state bureaucracy and 
created an entrepreneurial environment through which firms could operate. The Corporate and Private 
Enterprise Laws (1990) shortly followed, allowing private enterprise to develop in order to reinvigorate 
the struggling economy. Prior to the establishment of these laws, the State implemented authoritarian 
control over business, prohibiting private enterprise to the extent where it was illegal. One interviewee 
shared their experience of private enterprise in Vietnam prior to reform: 
Before 1986 you have to queue in line to buy your meat by a state-run company you’re not allowed 
to buy a cow and butcher it and bring it to city yourself, business is against the law... It was mind-
blowing. The ability to run your own business was a completely forgotten concept prior to the 
reform (BO1, 2017). 
New legislation enabled private enterprise to compete in most fields of business, except those defined 
as ‘strategically’ or ‘critically’ important to the State (BO2, 2017). This included matters of national 
interest such as the military, telecoms, money printing etc. Following this, SMEs quickly became the 
engine for growth in Vietnam’s economy, as 17,400 new businesses started up by 1994 (see Figure 2). 
As part of the wider reforms, the State acknowledged, and committed to, the protection of private 
ownership of land and capital, which encouraged the private sector to invest and grow rapidly (World 
Bank, 2014). At the same time, equitisation of SOEs also created chances for further private investment 
in economic sectors (Truong et al., 2004). Investment and capital therefore flowed to the areas that 
needed it the most (BO2, 2017). 
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The next stage of Doi Moi focused on reforming SOEs through Decision 143-HDBT (1989/1990), 
which was a radical programme intended to shrink the number of loss-making SOEs and address the 
State’s growing budget deficit. While SOEs exist in order to govern particular sectors of the economy 
in the interests of the people, they have historically exhibited poor performance due to inefficiencies, 
corrupt management, and low profitability (Nguyen & Dijk, 2012). 
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Figure 2: Private Sector Enterprise Growth 1990-1994 
Source: World Bank (2014) 
 
Figure 3: Average net turnover-to-employee ratio (proxy for labour productivity, in billion VND) 
Source: World Bank (2011)   *note: while the period here does not correspond to the timeline above, it is indicative of the 
disparity between SOEs and private enterprise in general. (EES = Entire Enterprise Sector) 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
SOEs EES
T
u
r
n
o
v
er
/e
m
p
lo
y
ee
 V
N
D
 (
b
n
s)
 
 
 
31 
 
Responses of initial reforms were positive. The number of SOEs halved from 12,000 to 6,000 over the 
course of three years, as the most inefficient companies underwent closure or merged with other 
companies (McCargo, 2004). Figure 3 gives a further indication of the disparity between SOE 
performance and private-side performance, as productivity levels are considerably lower for SOEs. Due 
to a lack of competition, minimal incentive to generate profit and often corruption, the majority of SOEs 
in Vietnam have continuously been loss making (Wright and Nguyen, 2000). Low profitability means 
that SOEs rely on other state enterprises or banks in order to finance operations, resulting in excessive 
levels of debt28. The result of SOE reform therefore means that funding flows to more productive 
enterprise and savers have the opportunity to investment in better business opportunities.  
Given the socio-economic costs of SOEs, the State made a consolidated effort to accelerate the process 
of equitisation29. A pilot programme began in 1992, which focussed on equitizing and reducing benefits 
to small-medium sized SOEs in non-strategic sectors of the economy – such as cement, paper, steel and 
fertilizer. By eradicating direct subsidies to SOEs, the government hoped to incentivise competitive 
practice (Griffin, 1998). However, these efforts were lacklustre. The pilot scheme resulted in only five 
SOEs transferring business operations to the private side of the economy by May 1996. By 1994, the 
government made a further push in reducing the number of SOEs, namely through creation of General 
Corporation and Special Corporations for specific economic sectors (see Table 2). Although still under 
control of the State, these measures reduced costs and improved general efficiency. However, 
dominance of SOEs persisted to pose a major problem to the development of Vietnam’s financial system 
and overall economy.  
                                                          
28 Vinashin, previously a state-owned shipbuilding company operating during 1996-2010 exemplified such 
criticisms. The company accumulated mass debt (US$4.4billion), terminated several contracts and operated 
under corruption through the falsifying of reports (Duong, 2015). 
29 Equitisation of SOEs refers to the process whereby a SOEs transition to the private side of the economy, 
through converting into joint stock companies 
Vietnam Electric Corporation    Vietnam Settle Corporation 
Vietnam Coal Corporation    Vietnam Coffee Corporation 
Vietnam Petroleum Corporation    Vietnam Tobacco Corporation 
Vietnam Cement Corporation    Vietnam Paper Corporation 
Vietnam Maritime Corporation    Northern Food Corporation 
Vietnam Civil Aviation Corporation    Southern Food Corporation 
Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Corporation    Vietnam Chemicals Corporation 
Vietnam Gemstones and Gold Corporation    Vietnam Rubber Corporation 
Vietnam Textiles and Garments Corporation    Vietnam Railways Union 
Table 2: List of General Corporation and Special Corporations under control of the State 
Source: (Kokko and Sjoholm, 2000) 
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An additional issue challenging Vietnamese enterprise was that SOCBs’ politically induced bias 
towards failing state companies left less funding available for private companies. Thus, following 
mounting levels of bad debt, the banking system separated into two tiers. This was to correct the 
inefficiencies of misallocated capital and ensure that investment was reaching entrepreneurs. These 
reforms, labelled Decision No. 218/CT and Decision No. 53/ND (1987-1988), transitioned the mono-
tiered banking system into a two-tiered banking system. Before 1988, the Vietnamese banking sector 
compromised of four major SOCBs and one minor SOCB, where commercial banks controlled loan 
services for foreign trade, agriculture, industry and commerce, investment and development (SBV, 
2012). However, the establishment of a two-tiered banking system liberated the private-side of banking, 
providing alternative investment sources to prospective enterprise. Commercialised banks mobilised 
public savings and fostered a more efficient network of industry knowhow, leading to more investment 
in areas that had previously struggled to raise funding (U1, 2017). However, these large SOCBs lacked 
the competitive efficiency to keep up with China, Malaysia and Thailand (World Bank, 2014). Overall, 
while considerable headway had been made in channelling funds to more productive enterprise, SOCBs 
continued to present a barrier to further progression. A number of firms, therefore, lacked the capital 
funding necessary to pursue both day-to-day operations and longer term growth plans. 
The government introduced banking reforms due to a collective realisation that a high proportion of 
funding was flowing from SOCBs to inefficient SOEs, generating an unsustainable level of non-
performing loans (NPLs)30. Enjoying a high degree of market dominance in Vietnam, SOCBs held 
claim to 80% of the banking sector’s assets (Leung, 2009). This meant that the majority of available 
funds flowed to SOEs, despite their tendency to limit long-term economic growth. One interviewee 
explained that, although reforms were making progress in the right direction, policy-lending remained 
dominant in the credit landscape, “Credit facilities were afraid to not lend to SOEs. When the State asks 
for a favour, you don’t take any risks in saying no”(FA1 2017). The overwhelming proportion of 
investment funnelled towards SOEs remained the major challenge to effective financial development. 
According to a report from the IMF (1999), in 1997, only 40% of SOEs were termed “profitable”, 44% 
as “temporary loss-makers” and 16% as permanent loss-makers”. Government intervention, through 
channelling credit to loss-making SOEs, created inefficiencies, as scarce resources were misallocated.  
The main way in which this form of financial liberalisation changed the nature of capital allocation is 
that it allowed firms, namely the private sector, to borrow and raise funds publicly. The separation into 
a two-tiered banking system, combined with the deregulation of interest rate ceilings meant that banks 
had a higher freedom – and thus appetite – to lend to business organisations (Leung, 2009). Where 
previously SOCBs saturated the banking market and thus erected a major barrier to accessing funding, 
financial reform and deregulation of interest rates allowed more capital to reach the private sector. 
                                                          
30 Non-performing loans occur when a debtor has not made their payments for at least 90 days. 
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Consequently, firms of varying sizes, operating in various industries had easier access to funding (BO3 
2017; U1 2017). 
Banking credit to the private sector showed a marked improvement, increasing by 36.7% between 1990 
and 1996 (McCarty, 2001). Effects were additionally felt among my research participants, who drew 
on their personal experiences, highlighting how since the development of commercial banks, accessing 
finance for their business was easier and more efficient (FA2, 2017). However, given the rising levels 
of NPLs in Vietnam, deregulation of interest rates was gradual, in order to enable greater lending 
meanwhile filtering out the unreliable debtors. Vietnam’s steady approach to interest rate deregulation 
highlights how financial development has proceeded in Vietnam, showcasing how a gradual and well-
executed approach can have positive effects on business growth. 
Despite encouraging results from the two-tiered banking system and increasing amounts of policy 
stipulating that SOEs were no longer to enjoy favourable access to finance, private sector entrepreneurs 
still faced discrimination in raising funds. Many of my informants talked at length about how strict 
regulatory practices prevented the private sector from enjoying freedom in accessing capital funding. 
For example, a financial analyst claimed “Start-ups had no chance. Even with new regulations aimed 
at making finance more accessible, you had to be well-known in business ” (FA2, 2017) while another 
summarised the essence of the problem: “When competing against State-Owned Enterprises for capital 
in a centrally planned economy, there is only one winner” (FA1, 2017). The idea of having a “business 
credibility”, or “collateral” was one of many factors that prevented the private sector from expanding. 
Banks were reluctant to invest or loan capital to businesses who did not have an established business 
reputation or historic financial statements to prove sound business performance. These findings 
corroborate Leung’s (2009) analysis of financial reforms in Vietnam, which explained that firms had to 
prove two consecutive years’ profits before attaining a loan. Start-up businesses, therefore, found it 
incredibly difficult to secure lending.  
Although the Doi Moi reforms endeavoured to level the playing field among businesses in Vietnam, a 
funding bias towards SOEs persisted, meaning that SMEs struggled to finance business operations. The 
problem lay with the Investment Planning Department, an instrument of the State that allocated 
investments and factor inputs across multiple provinces in Vietnam (TT3, 2017). As business 
relationships and networks – confined to agents of the State – determined the majority of credit 
allocation, smaller firms struggled to access liquidity. Of the limited number of financial intermediaries 
that were available to provide credit, they were under control of the government (FA5, 2017). This 
meant accessing funding was difficult for private enterprise. The bulk of trade and investment, therefore, 
tilted heavily towards the State sector, limiting the prospects for future growth. As one business owner 
pointed out, ““Strategic industries” were the industries that got funding” (BO3, 2017). Relationships 
between the State and SOEs meant that capital did not flow to areas that needed it most. Interviewees 
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revealed that these relationships were the reason for why reforms did not translate into significant 
changes in capital allocation in practice.  
Clearly, as funds flowed primarily to SOEs, businesses operating in the same industries struggled to 
mobilise the large amounts of capital required for expansion. As an alternative, relational financing – 
typified by financing from families, friends and personal networks – became the dominant method 
through which firms could raise funds. Leveraging capital from personal networks is a value traditional 
to, and embedded in, Vietnamese business culture. This form of fundraising, whereby entrepreneurs to 
obtain “seed money” from a close circle of personal contacts, is known as relational financing. In the 
initial stages of reform, relational financing remained a popular way to fund operations and, today, at 
the lower end of the business scale, relational financing remains the dominant mode for accessing funds: 
The first $50,000 required to set up operations was raised from friends, family and other 
networks built over the years. It took quite a lot of us to pool that capital together, as it was a 
relatively big sum. (BO3, 2017) 
Due to a limited supply of investment channels, personal networks were the main source of funding for 
private enterprise, whilst close ties with SOCBs allowed SOEs to finance their operations. Despite 
extensive efforts to enhance liquidity and allocate funds more efficiently, a number of contextual factors 
posed a problem to Vietnam’s credit deficit.  
Following initial developments in economic policy, General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh continued to 
implement sweeping changes to the Vietnamese economy – most notably introducing the new Law on 
Foreign Direct Investment in 1987 (Anwar and Nguyen, 2010). This initiative legitimised FDI, offering 
alternative sources of capital to stimulate growth of the private economy, as initial waves of credit 
exceeded 10% of the country’s GDP in 1994 (Vietnam GSO, 2010). In comparison to other developing 
countries, Vietnam stood to benefit the most, as FDI inflows relative to the size of its economy 
outstripped its peers (Beresford, 2008). Inflows of FDI into Vietnam significantly contributed to the 
development of a corporate community, fuelling economic growth as new projects and new 
developments became affordable: 
Suddenly with Vietnam you just saw all these previous barriers to investment get lowered. There 
was a mass arrival of capital in this new found and newly booming economy. Foreigners 
wanted to buy Vietnam, they wanted to get their foot in the door early and be the first to benefit 
from relaxed investment laws (FA2, 2017)  
Prior to the Foreign Investment Law in 1987, investors lacked the incentive to invest in Vietnam because 
it was a high-risk economy and obtaining approval from local government was a laborious process 
(FA1, 2017). The regulatory challenges faced and restrictions imposed on foreign holdings of 
Vietnamese businesses meant that foreign investors struggled to generate consistent and attractive 
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returns (Painter, 2005). Policy revisions and the introduction of the FDI law meant that there was an 
up-turn in foreign investor sentiment. Investors took advantage of Vietnam’s booming economy, as a 
more stable macroeconomic outlook led to increased investment appetite. 
Evidently, revised laws on Foreign Direct Investment enticed investors to allocate funds to a wider array 
of sectors within the Vietnamese economy. Prior to the relaxation of such laws, US $ 1,603.5 million 
of registered capital was supporting 211 projects (Nguyen and Nguyen, 2007), resulting in businesses 
unable to obtain finance. After the Vietnamese economy had acclimatised to these new laws, capital 
inflows accelerated to reach US$ 18,379.1 million and supported 1,409 projects (World Bank, 2011). 
More funds reached broader sectors of the economy, allowing sectors that had previously seen 
lacklustre financing, such as services, to grow (see Figure 4).  In particular, investment opportunities 
lay in areas in which Vietnam had competitive advantage, their export market exhibiting strong growth. 
Xuan and Xing’s (2008) empirical analysis showed that a 1 percent rise in FDI typically leads to a 0.13 
percent rise in Vietnam’s exports to these countries. With their biggest assets being low labour costs 
and a deregulated environment, many businesses began relocating their investments into Vietnam: 
For Vietnamese business it was new lease on life. Multiple investment channels meant multiple 
opportunities for growth. It really unlocked doors for many industries that previously required 
large amounts of capital to begin with. (BO4, 2017) 
In addition to funding general business, FDI helped Vietnam to exploit new industries that were 
previously too expensive – such as oil and gas as well as high-tech manufacturing (IMF, 2002). Where 
previously high start-up costs were barriers to entering these markets, FDI allowed Vietnam to explore 
new opportunities and leverage untapped resources. This was a point made by several of my 
interviewees, which corroborates the data taken from the Foreign Administration presented in Figure 4 
Figure 8: FDI by sector (1988-2006) 
Source: Nguyen and Nguyen (2007) 
 
Figure 9: FDI by sector (1988-2006) 
Source: Nguyen and Nguyen (2007) 
 
Figure 10: FDI by sector (1988-2006) 
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below. During this period, large amounts of funds flowed towards Oil & Gas (27%), Hotel/Tourism 
(21.4%) and Agriculture (13.9%). The nature of capital allocation thus began to shift away from state 
control, as foreign investors sought the opportunity to capitalise on particular sectors ripe for growth. 
However, Vietnamese SMEs still struggled to raise funds. While many of my respondents noted how 
Decision No. 218/CT & Decision No. 53/ND had facilitated the mobilisation of capital towards private 
sector business, there was still a “credit-gap”. The effects of financial reforms took time to materialise 
and as a result, domestic credit to private sector did not begin rapidly growing until the end of the 20th 
Century (Leung, 2008). SOEs remained a major hindrance to effective financial development, as the 
majority of credit reached their business ventures (Figure 5), resulting in inefficient allocation of capital 
(Harrison and Bui, 2013). In short, despite policy reform, the State sector sustained a “crowding out” 
effect on private investment towards the end of the 1990s. 
The crowding out effect had knock-on effects for the rest of the Vietnamese economy, as rising levels 
of non-performing loans sparked the need for caution. While the State initiated reforms tailored to 
address the burgeoning issue of a lack of financial development, businesses still faced difficulty in 
accessing funds (Leung, 2009). The State dictated the nature of capital allocation and consequently 
funnelled it to SOEs.  As a response, the Vietnamese authorities made a more comprehensive effort to 
reform the financial services industry, diversifying investment channels and thus increase funds 
accessibility (Malesky and Taussig, 2008). 
In a response to ineffective policy, the Vietnamese State revised Decree 53 (1990), applying a more 
open-door policy towards investment and allowing private and foreign enterprise to enter the banking 
sector. New types of banks established presence in Vietnam. Joint Stock Commercial Banks (JSCBs), 
owned by private companies, individuals or governments. Joint Venture (JV) banks, owned by two or 
more parties, typically by government and private investors. And finally, Fully Foreign-Owned 
Commercial Banks (FOCBs), run by companies with headquarters abroad. Additionally, international 
banks such as HSBC, Standard and Chartered, and ANZ now provided banking services to the 
Vietnamese population, as previous regulations dictating their ability to conduct business in Vietnam 
were relaxed. Most pertinent to this project, was the ability for foreign banks to begin extending credit 
to businesses in Vietnam who were looking to grow and expand their business operations: 
It took a while for foreign banks to make a noticeable change. Acclimatising to the Vietnam 
economy as well as bypassing regulation meant that there was a delay before firms could access 
capital through foreign-owned banks (FA3, 2017) 
The introduction of foreign bank branches offered an alternative for firms looking to access funds, 
promoting competitive capacity within the banking sector. Indeed, as figure 5 shows, since 2001, the 
overall proportion of investment radically changed. Where previously, ~70% of investment was dictated 
by the state sector, by 2012 ~65% of total investment was via the non-state and Foreign Invested Sector.  
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Ultimately, this posed a challenge to SOCBs, as foreign banks gained more market share and built on 
their provision of credit services (see Figure 6). Thus, new forms of capital investment were available 
to SMEs in Vietnam. Figure 6 displays the dwindling power of SOCBs in allocating credit to businesses 
in Vietnam, as their overall share highlights a strong downward trend of 12.2% per annum over the 
course of 6 years (HSBC, 2014). These changes, however, did not happen immediately, as there was a 
time lag before the effects began to materialise. 
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The initial introduction of foreign owned-banks in Vietnam had positive ramifications for Vietnamese 
businesses, by way of growth in liquidity, credit and deposits – as foreign banks had a desire to capitalise 
on Vietnam’s rapidly expanding SME sector. For many of the business owners interviewed, foreign 
banks evolved to become the main source of finance, in some cases their only option. The first bank to 
establish operations in Vietnam was ANZ (1993), which subsequently prompted the influx of more 
foreign-owned banks to Vietnam. The majority of foreign banks focussed on the commercial corporate 
side of lending, funding FDI projects. Therefore, in the years to follow the rework on credit institutions, 
there was a shift in the nature of funding. Where previously some SMEs had struggled to access finance, 
accelerating levels credit growth (Figure 5) channelled specifically to the private sector and a wider 
provision of financial services (Figure 6) meant that more businesses could expand. Enhanced 
efficiency in capital investments across the economy marked the success of the decree revision, and 
therefore financial development. 
Overall, the Doi Moi reforms marked the beginning of a radical re-engineering of the economy. The 
legitimisation and recognition of private enterprise was instrumental in developing new private 
enterprise. However, SMEs faced difficulty in achieving sustainable growth, as the economy still 
operated under the elements of central planning. SOEs were the biggest obstacles for private enterprise, 
as they enjoyed favourable terms of credit and a high degree of business sovereignty. Similarly, 
although the capital account had been liberalised and initial impacts were exciting, FDI was a younger 
form of finance that the Vietnamese economy was not familiar with using. Further reforms were 
required in order to aid the development of the market economy. 
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4.2 1995-1999: International Integration and the Market Economy 
Following appointment to Prime Minister in 1991, Võ Văn Kiệt implemented extensive reforms centred 
around global integration. During this period, Vietnam’s focus was on deepening economic integration 
with the Mekong region, as well as establishing diplomatic ties with the rest of the world (Herr, 2016). 
The government branded Vietnam as a multicomponent economy under state management, reaffirming 
the primacy of the State (Riedel, 1999). The most notable development during this transition was the 
establishment of full diplomatic and trade partnerships with the U.S., which meant that Vietnam 
attracted significantly more inward FDI and international trade increased substantially (Binh and 
Haughton, 2002; Riedel and Pham, 2010). This period marked the beginning of Vietnam’s membership 
to the global community. The opportunity to work with internationally recognised and reputable 
organisations such as ASEAN meant that Vietnam was poised to take advantage of their growth 
potential. Phan Văn Khải, established as Prime Minister in 1997 furthered the work of Võ Văn Kiệt, 
but focussed more on reforming SOEs (Rama, 2008). 
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The signing of a Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) with America in 2000 was symbolic of this new 
global outlook and an increasingly open-door trade policy. The BTA displays Vietnam’s movement 
towards current account liberalisation and underscores the importance of removing overbearing 
restrictions, as the benefits of increased trade have translated to GDP/capita growth. Efforts to 
deregulate included a reduction of tariffs on U.S. exports by 25-50%, the provision of intellectual 
property rights and allowance of market access for services (Binh and Haughton, 2002). Figure 7 shows 
how since the implementation of the BTA, GDP/capita growth and export growth to the US exhibited 
a positive correlation (Trading Economics, 2018; U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). Many of my respondents 
spoke about the importance of USA as a market. For example, one business owner noted that 
The majority of my original customers came from America – and they still are. It is a huge 
market in general, the world’s biggest consumer. Without a trade agreement with America we 
would have to find new customers or find new jobs (BO4, 2017) 
Ranked as the number one consumer of Vietnamese products, the US accounts for 21% of Vietnam’s 
export market, contributing to over $38.1bn of Vietnam’s total GDP (OED, 2015). Overall, liberalising 
restrictions on the Vietnamese current account, exemplified by the US-Vietnam BTA, has had positive 
effects for economic growth. This has been particularly important in Vietnam, as the the role of trade 
negotiations has risen to reaffirm Vietnam’s status as an export-led economy. Firms that export goods 
and services with a high exposure to US consumption have been the major beneficiaries of a more open 
attitude towards global integration (BO4, 2017). 
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Additionally, in 1995, Vietnam gained membership to the Associate of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), which is a regional group promoting economic and political cooperation among its members. 
Integration into the ASEAN involved embracing free movement of goods and services as well as 
encouraging more FDI into the country (FA2, 2017). The main benefit from Vietnam’s participation is 
that it enjoys regular contact with some of the leading global and regional powers, diversifying and 
strengthening their client-base through extra cooperative schemes and organisations (Binh and 
Houghton, 2002; Tung, 2007). This new accession, combined with the downfall of the Soviet bloc 
meant that Vietnam had the prospect of new, affluent trade partners through the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA). Figure 8 and 8a display the relative GDP/Capita for each ASEAN member in 1993, 
graphically representing Vietnam’s wealth compared to others. Where Vietnam’s economic 
development lagged behind its ASEAN counterparts, new membership created new export 
opportunities. Geographic proximity allows for cheaper shipping costs and ease of trade, which 
currently contributes to over 9% of their exports and attributes to a significant amount of Vietnamese 
GDP growth (World Bank, 2017). Optimistic ASEAN emerging market growth coupled with the 
development of the middle-class consumer means that favourable terms of trade will continue to be an 
asset to the Vietnamese economy in the near future (TT1, 2017). Overall, the integration of 400million 
people in the ASEAN market created the opportunity for Vietnam to extend into untapped markets as 
well as attract long-term investment.  
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Figure 8a: Proportion of Importing ASEAN clients (Vietnam, 2015) 
Source: http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/vnm/e : World Bank (2017) 
 
Figure 8: GDP/Capita ASEAN Countries (1993) 
Source: World Bank 2017 
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According to several interviewees, Formulating cohesive and collaborative relationships among 
multiple nations as well as with globally recognised bodies was additionally beneficial for Vietnam, as 
it instilled confidence among investors looking to allocate funds in Vietnam: 
The benefit of ASEAN is that it means that we have consumers and we attract more investment. 
Vietnam is perceived as less risky and more stable because it is a bit of a secured income. The 
whole idea of “stronger together”, whether it be economics or defence, really comes into 
fruition here. (BO1, 2017) 
When we [Investment Company] were setting up operations, that fact that Vietnam were part 
of ASEAN was good for investment. Having the backing of some powerful nations was 
reassuring and people trusted in Vietnam. (FA2, 2017) 
By complying with ASEAN rules and regulations, members cultivate greater trust among potential 
trading partners and investors. The agreement provides a level of security for investors, meaning they 
can more confidently allocate their investments to areas that need it most. Although FDI was flowing 
into Vietnam before 1995, more favourable terms of trade with US and diplomatic ties with the wider 
global economy meant that investment commitments reached their peak in 1996 (Figure 9).  
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FDI was integral to developing the market economy, as it offered wider opportunities for accessing 
funding, therefore correcting inefficiencies of state-capital allocation. Hoping to capitalise on the 
rapidly growing economy, the US committed over US$10billion of FDI in 1996, which had 
reverberating effects for employment, consumption, innovation and export growth: 
Before the Financial Crisis, FDI was the hype. Because of a newfound friendship with the US, 
considerable amounts of cash entered the circular flow of the economy. The number of 
investment projects boomed at this point, as Vietnam became more attractive. We were getting 
more investment than most of our neighbours. (TT1, 2017) 
As a corollary, Vietnam’s GDP grew at record levels of 9.5% in 1995 and 9.3% in 1996 (Doanh, 2002). 
Overall, integrating deeper and forming enhanced relationship with the rest of the world, most notably 
the U.S., spurred the development of the market economy, as funds reached the most productive areas. 
The implications of accession to ASEAN can be broadly characterised in Table 3 below. 
 
Characteristic of 
ASEAN 
Implication for Vietnam 
A single market and 
production base 
 Removal of trade tariffs mean that prices for goods and services will 
be more competitive, allowing for a greater opportunity within the 
exporting market.  
 Bolsters the regional market, which benefits Vietnam, and attracts 
more investors to allocate funds due to attractive development rates. 
Political-Security  A robust political-security environment for Vietnam will neutralise 
fears for investors and change the country’s risk perception. Increase 
in FDI under the impression of stability. 
A region fully 
integrated into the 
global economy 
 Increasingly globalised outlook and greater bargaining power (as 
more countries means more economic weight) will give Vietnam 
access to a bigger market. 
Revised Single Market 
(for 2020) 
 Financial services and capital account liberalisation, capital market 
development and currency cooperation will enhance the ability for 
Vietnam to benefit from FDI.  
 Allows multiple economic bodies to congregate into one market and 
therefore diversify risk. Becomes increasingly attractive to foreign 
investors looking to allocate funds in Vietnam. 
Table 3: Summary of selected ASEAN criteria and the impacts they have on Vietnam  
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Vietnam’s commitment to financial development, through liberating their current and capital accounts 
had significant implications for the economy. Firstly, additional investment streams meant that firms 
previously suffering from a funding deficit received finance. Investors specifically chose companies to 
invest in that were productive and those that would generate returns – connecting savers with 
entrepreneurs. Secondly, membership of internationally recognised bodies meant that firms were 
required to meet accountancy and disclosure standards. Greater information available on the market 
therefore meant that prices were accurate and thus the economy allocated funds more efficiently. 
Finally, Vietnamese firms were able to learn more effective business strategies from firms also in the 
ASEAN.  
Having said that, the AFC exposed a weakness in the process of stock market integration, as investors 
rapidly withdrew their investments and Vietnamese businesses suffered as an expense. Radelet and 
Sachs’ paper (1998) emphasise the role of financial panic among international investors in the AFC., 
drawing attention to how “small effects can have large consequences” (54). That is, arguing that the 
rapid removal of capital exacerbated the AFC. In the absence strong financial institutions, legal 
foundations and anti-corruption measures, Vietnam was more vulnerable to the crisis than it should 
have been. Ultimately, while FDI offered a promising means of accessing funds for economic 
development, in also exposed the country to acute economic risks that were realised during the crisis.  
While considerable efforts were made to integrate into the global economy, pro-capitalist commentators 
were critical of the commercialisation process so far, arguing that it had proven slow and ineffective, 
reflecting incoherent development policies. Figure 10 provides a representation of the declining 
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ownership of SOEs, by analysing how ownership of specific sectors has transferred to non-state agents. 
Over a four-year period, the State achieved marginal differences in restructuring business ownership, 
even though privatisation was a cornerstone policy for financial development. Empirically, the GDP by 
sector and ownership for state enterprises reduced by 0.84%, while for non-state enterprises it increased 
by 1.49% (Painter, 2005). Initial reform targets proved ambitious, yet flawed. By the end of 1997, only 
15 SOEs became joint stock companies.  
In order to rectify the slow progress made to date, the government initiated Decree 28 in 1996, which 
extended the previous programme and broadened SOE renovation to include all SMEs that were not in 
strategic sectors (TT2, 2017). This included the devolution of powers to local provinces and 
municipalities. Political institutions in geographical proximity to SOEs would have a greater 
understanding of which ones were inefficient and therefore warranted equitisation or reform, in theory 
speeding up the process. Yet, the output of these efforts was limited. Across 1996-1998, only 25 
additional SOEs equitized (Painter, 2005). 
In response to further criticism, the Vietnamese State introduced a strict 4-year plan (1998-2001) geared 
towards accelerating equitisation of SOEs and levelling the playing field between private enterprise and 
state enterprise. Additionally, the National Enterprise Restructuring Committee (NERC) was 
established in order to aid the process. The main efforts summarised below in Table 4: 
 
 
Alongside the general policy reforms, the State adopted Decree 44 which provided a legal framework 
through which equitisation could operate in. First, the State made equitisation compulsory – where 
previously SOEs chose between the option to participate or not. Second, SOEs were categorised into 
three groups, dependent on their level of “importance” and equitised accordingly. The State would 
retain a higher proportion of shares for SOEs considered essential to the functioning of the economy, 
those of “public interest”. SOE reform policy (1995-1999) marked a turning point for Vietnam’s 
economy, as numbers of successful equitisations surged to a total of 845 during 1998-2002 (Figure 11). 
The NERC documented that the majority of reform be focussed on the garments, marine products and 
Table 4: Summary of the 4- Year Reform Programme 
Measure  Action 
Stricter Financial Discipline  Restrain credit growth 
 Monitor highly leveraged SOEs 
Increase Transparency and 
Disclosure 
 Report systematic data and financial reporting  
 Externally audited accounts 
 Ministry of Finance management of information 
Facilitate Equitisation  Remove shareholder caps 
 Encourage SOE IPOs 
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textiles sectors, as forecasts predicted these to be areas for export and employment growth as well as 
having strong potential for attracting foreign-direct investment (FA5, 2017).  
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Figure 211: Number of SOEs equitised (1992-2002) 
Source: Painter (2005); World Bank (2006) 
 
Figure 221: Number of SOEs equitised (1992-2002) 
Source: Painter (2005); World Bank (2006) 
 
Figure 231: Number of SOEs equitised (1992-2002) 
Source: Painter (2005); World Bank (2006) 
 
Figure 241: Number of SOEs equitised (1992-2002) 
Source: Painter (2005); World Bank (2006) 
i  1 : Number of SOEs equitised (19 2-20 2) 
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4.3 2000-2007: Development of Capital Markets and Increased Globalisation 
A second stage of financial development (Doi Moi 2) began around the turn of the millennium, with 
efforts to restructure investment regimes and develop capital markets, integrate deeper with the world 
economy and continue SOE renovation. Specifically, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai (1997-2006) made 
a number of commitments to continue boosting economic prosperity through the Enterprise Law (2000), 
the establishment of the Stock Exchanges (2000 & 2005), and Vietnam's accession into the WTO 
(2007). These policies spurred growth, as Vietnam’s GDP grew from 33.64billion USD to 63.37billion 
USD, marking an 88% increase during 2000-2007 (World Bank, 2011). 
Through a critical review of the implementation of Socio-economic Development Strategy for the 
period of 2001-2010, Vietnam decided to continue promoting industrialization (Beresford, 2008). In 
2005, revisions to the Enterprise Law replaced previous regulations specific to private enterprises, 
applying them universally to all forms of ownership with the view of levelling the playing field. The 
Enterprise Law, originally created in 2000, encouraged foreign investors to allocate more funds in 
Vietnam through improving the legal framework surrounding investment and corporate governance – 
generating higher levels of investment activity from foreign businesses. The Enterprise Law makes the 
process of starting operations in Vietnam more efficient, as it enables businesses to register in Vietnam 
before gaining acceptance from the government (Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006). In order to 
compliment these revisions, additional administrative units supported investment registration for 
projects of any size, industry and sector: 
The Enterprise Law was a huge step towards positive deregulation for Vietnam; it just made 
investing in Vietnam easier. It created jobs, investment opportunities and contributed to overall 
economic growth as more businesses kick-started operations in Vietnam. (TT1, 2017) 
Where previously firms existed but were not registered, the new system allowed companies to bypass 
government approval. As a result, entrepreneurial activity – characterised by private firm registration – 
doubled in volume in 1999 when compared to previous years (Brown, 2002). Easier and more attractive 
regulatory structures were well-received among business owners who have benefitted from a more 
liberalised economy (World Bank, 2016). Empirically, the number of joint stock companies developed 
rapidly, as by November 2008, 270,000 of them had registered (Riedel, 1997). Overall, the Enterprise 
Law solved a number of underlying issues facing the Vietnamese economy. Financial development 
fostered a more entrepreneurial environment, levelling the playing field between SOEs and private 
enterprise, as well as connecting deeper with the global economy.  
However, the early 2000s also saw the reappearance of high levels of non-performing loans, corruption 
and over-leveraged companies defaulting, leaving banks reluctant to lend (Brown, 2002). Businesses, 
therefore, experienced a funding shortage, restricting their capability to invest in new business ventures 
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– economic growth suffered. In order to counter-act the emergence of bad debt, the State issued a 
number of responses to support SOCBs (summarised in Table 5). 
Year Measure Purpose 
2001 Development Assistance Fund  Channelling funds to a “superbank”, named the 
Development Assistance Fund 
 Allocate capital across the economy to areas in 
deficit, ensuring that due diligence is done and 
debtors are creditworthy 
2001 SBC Decision 1627-QD-
NHVN 
 Categorise debts by category: doubtful and bad 
 Allow for more effective management of NPLs 
and facilitation of how to address said issue 
2002 SBV Decision 171-2000-QD-
NHNN 
 Regulatory framework overseeing the conduct of 
the SBV Risk Reserve 
 Risk level established at 10% of SBV’s revenue, 
in order to avoid a credit crunch and offset losses 
occurring from NPLs. 
2004 SOCB Aid  Recapitalising SOCBs through rerouting 
doubtful debts to the Debt and Asset Trading 
Company (DATC).  
 Write off of uncollectable debt for SOCBs 
 
Table 5: Targets and Intentions of the Vietnamese States' Efforts to Reduce NPLs 
The effects of such policies were, however, negligible. Issues lay with ideology, corruption and 
inefficient SOEs and SOCBs, rather than with the banking sector as a whole (Painter, 2003). By the end 
of 2003, SOCBs accounted for VND 35 trillion (USD 2.235 billion) of uncollectable debt (Hoang, 
2004). Piling levels of bad loans were the result of “connections lending” (Malesky and Taussig, 2008) 
– where SOCBs’ personal ties with SOEs result in ‘directed loans’ flowing to their business ventures, 
despite their inefficiencies. Rather than addressing the result of the problem through bailing out SOCBs, 
the Vietnamese State needed to address the cause of the problem. This meant central reform over 
SOCBs and SOEs, with the view of ensuring that credit did not flow to inefficient ventures (U1, 2017). 
Indeed, the government’s intention to hand over commercial lending powers to the free-market was to 
achieve greater efficiency when allocating scarce credit.  
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Prior to reform, funds were not being allocated upon the principles of efficiency as SOCBs enjoyed 
great advantages that restricted private commercial banks from competing, including: 
 Size and scale (branches set up in abundance all over the country) 
 Direct funds to raise equity 
 Financial support in the event of poor performance 
 Reputation of state-backed support 
 Economies of scale to help lower the cost of funding 
In order to correct this problem, the State implemented a reform programme in 2001 to strengthen the 
banking system and enable funds to flow to the most commercially viable activities. Firstly, the focus 
was to improve the regulatory framework – ensuring that both clients and banks adhere to a transparent 
code of conduct (Ho and Baxter, 2011). This included conducting due diligence on loan applicants, 
ensuring their project is viable and likely to generate returns. The goal of this was to ensure that business 
is financed due to it being an attractive entrepreneurial opportunity, rather than due to nepotism. 
Secondly, the State attempted to level the playing field between SOCBs and JSCBs (Leung, 2009). This 
meant that privately owned banks, or foreign owned banks, were able to leverage their efficiency as 
well as technical knowhow in a less restrictive marketplace (FA3, 2017). Additionally, the banking 
sector was encouraged to enhance the provision of credit services. More capital flowed to areas of 
higher productivity and therefore improved allocative efficiency. Finally, SOCBs underwent 
commercial restructuring (Ho and Baxter, 2011). The government introduced performance-based 
targets in order to incentivise profits, as well as address the burden of NPLs.  
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The banking sector showed marked improvements, as by the end of 2007, the proportion of credit 
allocated to the economy from the State sector had reduced by 24% (see Figure 12) while foreign banks’ 
share increased, accounting for 12% of the economy’s lending portfolio. The benefits of enhanced 
provision of banking services was widely felt among my participants who expressed that broader access 
to finance was integral to business success. 
Although underplayed in the literature, relaxed restrictions on foreign banks and a more competitive 
landscape allowed for the introduction of more advanced banking products, which facilitated business 
growth. Most commonly used among business-owners interviewed were trade finance products – which 
are short-term products that allow companies to mitigate risk and maintain a healthy cash flow when 
conducting trade (BO4, 2017). Interviewees spoke to the importance of trade finance, explaining how 
it had become a crucial part of obtaining new customers, as well as for expanding on relationships with 
existing clients. For example, one interviewee explained that:  
There have been occasions where we have wanted to invest in a new product line, but because 
of delays in payment from international trades, we have missed the opportunity… This form of 
financing allows us to be constantly expanding and growing the business. Day to day we 
make use of amounts from 20k up to 400k, so it is a big part of our business. (BO3, 2017) 
Fisman and Love (2003) empirically document the importance of “inter-firm financing”, showing a 
positive relationship between countries who frequently use trade credit services and growth. This holds 
particularly true for geographies with weak financial institutions – such as Vietnam. Klapper (2006) 
builds on this, explaining that firms in developed countries will only conduct business in countries with 
a low credit rating if they are able to assure that the quality of goods is to the required standard. Where 
previously weak contract enforcements or weak legal structures surrounding debt-collection prevented 
business growth, trade credit offered companies looking to work with SMEs in Vietnam an insurance 
policy at a relatively low cost (BO4, 2017). The introduction of more technical products, because of 
foreign bank presence, allows countries such as Vietnam to conduct more trade (Auboin and DiCaprio, 
2017). Overall, trade finance facilitates Vietnamese exporters to further business activities and develop 
a stronger client base.  
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In sum, the development of financial services through the introduction of foreign banks over this period 
meant that businesses had a wider choice in credit suppliers and a wider choice in credit product, 
meaning more companies can raise the required funds for expansion. However, access to finance was 
still not as widespread as it needed to be. In order to correct this, the State made a commitment to 
developing the capital markets. The next step, therefore, was for the State to explore capital market 
development. 
 
The Vietnamese capital market made considerable progress during 2000-2007, as debt and equity 
markets have become two primary channels for capitalisation (FA2, 2017). In order to alleviate bank-
based financing problems and a lack of credit facilities, the Vietnamese State made considerable efforts 
to construct capital markets in the early 2000s. The inauguration of the Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi Stock 
Exchanges are symbolic of contemporary capitalism and represent a commitment to the development 
agenda for the rest of the country.  
The Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi Stock Exchanges opened in 2000 and 2005 respectively, with the hope of 
correcting underlying inefficiencies of funding misallocation (Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006). The 
securities market, characterised by stock, bonds and investment funds, grew rapidly between 2000 and 
2006 (see Figure 13). Increased money supply (M2), which rose approximately 25% year on year during 
2000-2007, has translated to higher income/output/spending in the economy, attesting to annual growth 
rates of 7% (Trading Economics, 2017). Development of the capital markets changed the nature of 
funding allocation, as productive enterprises were able to undertake business expansion and longer-
term projects that previously unfeasible through traditional funding channels in an exchange for equity: 
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Previously you had personal financing, which would only get you so far. Then you had banks, 
which were biased to SOEs. Not to mention their extraordinary amount of NPLs held them back 
from lending credit to potentially good business. Then you had the introduction of the capital 
markets…they need work but it is definitely an interesting time for Vietnam (TT1, 2017) 
Diversified investment streams meant that increased amounts of funding was beginning to flow to areas 
that needed it the most. Individuals in Vietnam were able to invest their savings in the securities market, 
yielding capital appreciation and dividend payments. At the same time, companies were able to unlock 
new sources of liquidity required for expansion. Given the nature of the stock market, investors also 
engaged in riskier investments – which previously bank-based financing would have ignored. Vietnam 
expanded the role of the markets in the economy in order to answer a credit gap within the economy. 
Productive business ventures that previously struggled to raise funds now received an influx of 
investment.  
Following the turbulence of the AFC of 1997-98, the Vietnamese State focussed on accelerating 
financial development – establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework in order to develop and 
sophisticate their financial systems (Brown, 2002). The highly speculative nature of the stock market 
exacerbated the problems of the 1997 crash, as investors increased their exposure to Vietnam among 
optimistic business sentiment. However, the issue was that transparency and disclosure were 
underdeveloped and therefore investments were misinformed. According to the World Bank (2004), the 
reform agenda included the a number of facets:  
 Closer supervision and tighter discipline of banks  
 Greater transparency in financial transactions  
 Promoting competitive behaviour 
 Enactment of bankruptcy laws and stronger commercial codes 
 Strengthening of the rule of law.  
As a corollary, the State established a number of regulatory bodies and laws in order to oversee the 
capital markets (U1, 2017). Cornerstone initiatives have included the Securities Law in January 2007, 
a revisiting of the Investment Law 2005 and the Enterprises Law 2005 – creating a theoretical regulatory 
structure for the conduct of the capital markets (Hoang, 2004). The Ministry of Finance is the body 
responsible for ensuring that the stock exchanges, the companies and the investment funds meet the 
necessary regulatory requirements. This commitment to regulations reflects a collective realisation 
within Vietnam, that is, weak transparency has been a hindrance to economic growth (TT1, 2017). 
Lower transparency correlates strongly with higher levels of corruption, which translates to a 
combination of higher costs of business and investor scepticism over a high-risk jurisdiction (World 
Bank, 2014). In addition, inaccurate price signals lead to inefficient allocation of resources. Achieving 
an attractive risk-return profile in Vietnam, therefore, became challenging and market participants were 
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reluctant to invest (TT3, 2017). Indeed, for the World Bank, improving transparency through regulation 
is the “low-hanging fruit of transition that has yet to be harvested” (2011: 79). For Vietnam, the critical 
barrier to obtaining confidence from international investors is that basic levels of accounting and 
auditing standards remain underdeveloped: 
All this discussion is based on the institutions of accounting, valuation and auditing. Checks, 
balances and independents. But here, it is just a bunch of lies. People have different books, 
different reports to do whatever you need to do, whatever you need to do to legitimise your 
taxes. (TT1, 2017) 
Overall, reforms and developments made to the financial systems of Vietnam had positive effects for 
the economy – most notably the private sector, as funds were directed to supporting their business 
ventures (Anwar and Leung, 2011). Figure 14 and Figure 15 below, alongside Table 6, display how the 
nature of capital allocation has changed in Vietnam across 2001, indicating a positive impact of growth 
in investment. Across the period, there has been a role reversal between the public sector and state 
sector. Where in 2001, the State provided 60 percent of the investment to the economy, capital allocation 
had titled. By 2006, the foreign and private sectors contributed to nearly 55% of investment.  
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Figure 384: Growth in Investment as a Proportion of GDP (2001-2007) 
Source: GSO (2017) 
 
14: Growth in Investment as a Proportion of GDP (20 1-20 7) 
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Figure 354: Growth in Investment as a Proportion of GDP (2001-2007) 
Source: GSO (2017) 
 
Figure 364: Growth in Investment as a Proportion of GDP (2001-2007)Figure 14: Growth in Investment as a Proportion of 
GDP (2001-2007) 
Source: GSO (2017) 
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  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Banking             
Credit to the Economy (VND tril.) 159 189 231 291 420   
Credit to the Economy (Growth rate)   21% 22% 28% 42%   
Credit to the Economy (% of GDP) 35% 41% 44% 50% 59%   
Claims on SOEs (% of total credit) 45% 42% 39% 36% 34%   
Claims on SOES (% of GDP) 16% 17% 17% 18% 20%   
Securities             
Stocks             
Listed companies (companies) 5 11 20 22 26 30 
Market Cap (VND tril.)       2.3 3.8 5.9 
Market Cap (% of GDP)             
Bonds             
Listed bonds (issues) 4 18 41 103 207 287 
Listing value (par value) (VND tril.) 1.2 2.9 4.3 11.9 23.9 33.7 
Listing value (par value) % of GDP.) 0.30% 0.60% 0.80% 2.00% 3.40%   
Investment Fund             
Listed Fund (funds) 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Listing value (par value) (VND tril.) 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 
Listing value (% of GDP) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.10%   
Table 6: Growth of the Financial Sector's Share in Capital Allocation (2000-2005) 
Source: World Bank (2006) 
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Figure 15: Share of Investment Contributed to Economy by Sector (2001-2006) 
Source: GSO (2017) 
 
Figure 425: Share of Investment Contributed to Economy by Sector (2001-2006)Figure 15: Share of Investment Contributed to 
Economy by Sector (2001-2006) 
Source: GSO (2017) 
 
Figure 435: Share of Investment Contributed to Economy by Sector (2001-2006) 
Source: GSO (2017) 
 
Figure 445: Share of Investment Contributed to Economy by Sector (2001-2006)Figure 15: Share of Investment Contributed to 
Economy by Sector (2001-2006) 
Source: GSO (2017) 
 
Figure 455: Share of Investment Contributed to Economy by Sector (2001-2006)Figure 15: Share of Investment Contributed to 
Economy by Sector (2001-2006) 
Source: GSO (2017) 
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In March 2001, the Ninth Party Congress announced a five-year reform plan, with the view of achieving 
an equilibrium between State and business goals. Specifically, to boost the presence of SOEs in strategic 
areas of the economy whilst equitizing those that were not key sectors for the State31.  Strategic SOEs 
were to become integral to the future of Vietnam’s economic development. Alongside this proposal to 
enhance the role of the State in business, modes of restructuring strengthened. The State’s plan to 
equitise non-strategic sectors was ambitious. Specifically, the government hoped to reform 1,800 out 
of 5,571 SOEs within 3 years – considerably more than achieved in previous years. Figure 16 shows 
the success of the State reform agenda, in both cutting down numbers of SOEs and stimulating private 
sector growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 "[P]roviding necessary public- utility goods and services for the demand of national defence and security, being 
the key force in boosting economic growth, and providing ground for the industrialization and modernization of 
the country with the socialist orientation" (Ninth Party Congress, 2001 quoted in Painter, 2003: 6). 
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4.4 2007-Present: Modernisation of the Financial Economy 
After having enjoyed nearly two decades of real growth32 and rapid development of the private sector, 
2007 marked the beginning of a slowdown in the Vietnamese economy. With a lack of credit being the 
main barrier to private sector development, the State committed to developing the financial services in 
Vietnam, to help alleviate persisting credit pressures faced post-2008. See Table 7 for specific 
commitments to developing the financial sector and increasing credit accessibility. 
Commitment Desired Effect 
WTO 
Accession 
 Capital and current account liberalisations to drive future growth in Vietnam 
through increased investment and increased aggregate demand 
 Increased confidence from other nations as Vietnam integrates with a 
prestigious and globally recognised body 
Private Bank 
Autonomy 
 Allow private banks to allocate funds based principally on the free market, 
allowing funds to reach the most productive business ventures and thereby 
maximise efficiency of resources. 
 Enhance competition between banks so that they become more efficient 
 Eradicate the role of “capitalist cronyism” in business, so that factor inputs are 
delegated because of merit, not network status 
 Leverage expertise and technical knowhow of foreign banks 
Enhanced 
Development 
of Capital 
Markets 
 Remove foreign restriction limits to entice investors to allocate more funds in 
Vietnam 
 Develop regulatory systems in order to prevent the potential of financial crisis 
SOE 
Equitisation 
 Transfer more economic power to the private side of the economy, with the 
hope of reducing inefficiencies  
 
The beginning of this period began with the GFC, which had seismic impacts for both investment and 
capital mobility (Thanh, 2008). With 50% of outstanding credit tied up in mortgage-backed securities 
and real-estate developments, the State re-evaluated the banking sectors’ lending policies (World Bank, 
2011). Over subsequent years, banking credit tightened even further in order to address mounting piles 
of bad debt, leaving less available for enterprises in Vietnam (Rama, 2008). In the long-term, the 
Vietnamese economy suffered. By 2012, growth slowed down to 5.2% (the lowest for over a decade) 
and over 100,000 businesses defaulted because of weak aggregate demand and reduced investment 
                                                          
32 Growth that is inflation adjusted. 
Table 7: Efforts to Develop the Financial Sector and Address the Credit Crisis in Vietnam 
 
 
Table 7: Efforts to Develop the Financial Sector and Address the Credit Crisis in Vietnam 
 
 
Table 8: Efforts to Develop the Financial Sector and Address the Credit Crisis in Vietnam 
 
Table 9: Efforts to Develop the Financial Sector and Address the Credit Crisis in Vietnam 
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appetite (Leung, 2009). This chapter provides an overview of the recent developments in the financial 
sector of Vietnam, whilst taking stock on the main ways SMEs go about raising funds. 
Lower growth figures were also a result of inefficient allocation of resources, as the State channelled 
larger proportions of the budget to unprofitable areas of the economy (SOEs). Figure 17 and Table 8 
below show the effect of increased amounts of capital allocated to SOEs for 2008-2009. The graphs 
indicate that as SOEs receive a greater level of investment, the Vietnamese economy suffered, 
experiencing lower growth and higher inflation. 
 
    Unit %   
Year State Budget Borrowed Funds SOE Capital 
2001 44.7 28.2 27.1 
2002 43.8 30.4 25.8 
2003 45 30.8 24.2 
2004 49.5 25.5 25 
2005 54.4 22.3 23.3 
2006 54.1 14.5 31.4 
2007 54.2 15.4 30.4 
2008 61.8 13.5 24.7 
2009 64.3 14.1 21.6 
2010 44.8 36.6 18.6 
 
Table 8: Implemented Capital of SOEs, (2001-2010) 
Source: GSO (2011), Trading Economics (2017) 
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Figure 507: CPI vs. GDP, Vietnam (2001-2012) 
Source: GSO (2011), Trading Economics (2017) 
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Although SOEs have historically accounted for a large proportion of GDP, research participants 
expressed a high degree of dissatisfaction with the change in investment patterns. Interviewees felt that 
the State’s movement to re-introduce SOEs as the chief force for driving the strategic economy forward 
had resulted in increased corruption, greater inequality and less efficient allocation of resources. Indeed, 
for one interviewee: “Banks will lend to SOEs, because SOEs are functions of the State. If you don’t 
do what the State wants, you could be in trouble” (U1, 2017). Moreover, many research participants 
expressed that, when competing against SOEs, private firms do not enjoy a level playing field. There 
is, therefore, a huge incentive for government officials or senior employees within SOEs to reaffirm 
their position of authority:  
When you’re running a state-owned company, you govern the interests and then you are able 
to dictate where the land goes, the money goes. Why would you want to change it? (BO2, 
2017) 
To put it into perspective, the state sector absorbs 70% of social investment, 50% of state investment, 
60% of private credit and 70% of Official Development Assistance (ODA), while creating 10% of jobs 
(BBC, 2013). At the same time, SOEs have knock-on effects for the micro economy as firms lack the 
ability, and therefore incentive, to compete in industries where SOEs are present, as they exploit their 
anti-competitive advantage. Overall, SOEs enjoy preferential access to factor inputs, draining available 
credit for inefficient production of goods and services as well as abusing monopolistic powers over 
potential rival firms, limiting the development of the economy (Wacker, 2017).  
While challenges still remained, as SOEs maintained a strong position of authority within the 
Vietnamese economy, Vietnam’s accession to the WTO provided opportunities to develop new streams 
of finance and trade globally. After more than a decade of negotiations, Vietnam became a member of 
the WTO in 2006, and subscribed to WTO requirements in January 2007. The prospect of increased 
trade and investment was well-received by financial markets, as projected levels of growth soared. The 
benefits of WTO memberships can be broadly broken down into two categories resulting from 
liberalisation – investment and trade, both of which had a positive effect on economic growth.  
Similar to the US BTA, WTO membership removed restrictions that previously prohibited international 
trade, and Vietnam had preferential access to trade with some of the world’s leading economies.  Deeper 
integration with the global economy has been beneficial for internationalised SMEs in Vietnam, who 
are able to explore untapped markets through free-trade agreements. Specifically, many of my research 
participants spoke of how WTO membership provided opportunities to export to more lucrative 
markets, as well as tap into pools of investment. This was particularly true for businesses in the textile 
and apparel industries, as Vietnam removed previous quotas in 2007.  
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One of the biggest benefits for local businesses is that WTO membership appeals to foreign investors, 
as Vietnam’s economy becomes an increasingly attractive market (Brown, 2002). The WTO’s 
revisions of legislative frameworks on foreign companies modernised Vietnam’s outdated restrictions, 
stimulating more investment. Since joining the WTO, foreign enterprise looking to conduct business 
in Vietnam now operate under the same competitive elements as domestic enterprise (Brown, 2002). 
Furthermore, agreements made under the Trade-Related Investment Measures mean that since 
January 2008, foreign companies are able to own 100 percent-owned subsidiaries in the majority of 
economic sectors. Policy initiatives, under the jurisdiction of the WTO, have made Vietnam an 
environment more conducive to investment as means of conducting business was easier: 
Everyone wanted to capitalise on the growth, but the major problem of doing business in 
Vietnam was that it was difficult and time consuming. Adopting WTO changed this… As the 
regulatory environment eased, international investors wanted to get more involved (BO4. 2017) 
Figure 18 displays the effects of such financial developments, showing how FDI surged upon WTO 
membership. In short, deconstruction of previous trade barriers stimulated economic growth and long-
term opportunity. 
While FDI had become an increasingly attractive option for Vietnamese firms to raise funds, internal 
financing33 remains a common way to fund expansion and is often preferable to bank loans, bonds or 
                                                          
33 When a firm uses its own profits as a source of capital for investment 
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equity as there is a lower opportunity cost. This idea is rooted in Myers’ (1984) Pecking Order Theory34, 
as business owners interviewed expressed their preference to finance business expansion internally, as 
oppose to taking on debt and paying interest or selling equity in the company. This was a common 
theme among many of my informants. For example, one business owner expressed that, although they 
could leverage equity capital markets, they actively chose not to: 
We are probably big enough to IPO and we are potentially ready, but we would not do it. We 
want to retain control of our own company, rather than act in the short-term interests of 
shareholders. (BO3, 2017)  
The problem, however, with personal financing is that, loans rarely exceed $100,000 – and this is only 
in extreme cases. Typically, the amount available is considerably lower. Therefore, these forms of 
capital are at best a start-up loan, rather than a long-term investment for substantial business expansion. 
Yet, for many firms starting out, they require a large injection of funds, particularly if their business 
venture is expensive: 
On many recent occasions, we have contacted family members in order to finance projects – 
but that has only really been smaller amounts…. However, our business is slightly bigger than 
simply one shop, and in order to reach the clients we want to reach or to grow, we need larger 
investments. (BO2, 2017) 
As a corollary, SMEs in Vietnam struggle to raise the required capital to begin with. This acts as a 
barrier to economic growth for the wider economy, particularly given the role of SMEs. Consequently, 
entrepreneurs experience a high degree of uncertainty in obtaining loans. This became a major issue for 
many informants who stated that using forms of financing from family members for growth of business 
was slow and sporadic in parts.  
Despite being a common form of financing, particularly for younger firms, relational financing 
generally does not have the scale to deal with the magnitude of funding required. Due to Vietnam’s 
rapid growth rates, personal financing is unequipped to deal with the current levels of demand. Without 
the development of alternative and modern investment channels, Vietnam would have struggled to 
establish an environment conducive to the start-up community (Painter, 2003). The necessity for new 
forms of financing became apparent, as business owners applied pressure to the government to react 
accordingly. As a response, the Vietnamese government re-orientated the banking system, shifting more 
power to the private side in the hope of addressing this capital shortage. 
Bank-based systems have undergone a radical transition over the last two-decades. Most notably, 
increased provision of foreign banks coupled with autonomous allocation of credit have been positive 
                                                          
34 The idea that companies have a hierarchy of preferred capital structure 
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for Vietnamese SMEs. Over time, the Vietnamese State has gradually reformed the banking sector 
through a number of decrees, revisions and less restrictive controls on how they conduct business. 
While this thesis has already discussed the advantages of foreign banks, that is, increased provision of 
additional credit streams, an additional benefit is that they breakdown crony capitalism35. Historically, 
shifts towards a more free market economy have had limited impacts, as a strong relationship between 
the State and affiliated enterprises remains the primary force in dictating the nature of funds allocation. 
This allowed corruptive practices to boom, leaving unconnected private enterprise to bear the 
consequences (Tenev, 2003). However, according to my informants, the introduction of foreign banks 
as well as liberalisation of domestic banks has served to diminish the influence of the former ideological 
stance, challenging relational financing. Many informants explained their preference for working with 
foreign banks, as they have a greater appetite for risk and judge loan applications on the principles of 
merit, rather than if senior executives are well-connected:  
The Foreign Banks want to do business whereas some of the domestic banks want to support 
SOEs. Most of the business I do is through HSBC, they are more reliable. (BO4, 2017) 
Foreign banks have a greater appetite for doing business with Vietnamese SOEs. There have 
been several occasions where we have been turned down for a loan from a domestic bank but 
granted a loan from a foreign bank. (FA3, 2017) 
When probed further about why HSBC was more “reliable”, the interviewee explained that foreign 
banks undertake third party auditing checks on many of the firms they work with. Rival firms, on the 
other hand, leverage their personal network with state officials or senior members of financial 
intermediaries in order to achieve financing. This theme arose among many research participants. There 
is a clear division between the banks. Loans granted from domestic banks in some cases are the result 
of personal ties, and loans granted from foreign banks are the result of merit and business reputation. 
In some cases, loan applicants who had a personal connection to individuals holding positions in 
government or in banks received lower interest rates on the loan, despite not having the required 
collateral: 
To any international standard bank in Vietnam, like Standard Chartered or HSBC, they have 
independent auditing companies. Through this they can analyse what your property is worth 
and they will lend you about 60% of your assets – that is how business is done… This is not 
uniform. A friend of mine, because of her close ties to the CEO of the bank, she was able to 
borrow more than her assets were worth, and at an incredibly low rate. (BO1, 2017) 
                                                          
35 Whereby success in business is a result of relationships with government officials or business people. 
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These findings are reflective of a vast amount of the literature already written about private firms in 
Vietnam that are searching for finance. Le et al. (2006) find that networking with managers in 
organisations has a positive effect on obtaining funding, as they provide a level of legitimacy. In absence 
of established regulatory institutions, such as credit rating agencies, financial intermediaries turn to 
interpersonal relationships and reputation in order to measure previous business credibility. This 
becomes increasingly important for transitional and emerging economies, like Vietnam, where financial 
reporting standards are underdeveloped (Le and Nguyen, 2009). Despite efforts to reform bank lending 
practices and make accessing funds a fair process, officials at any level of politics have significant 
influence in allocating capital (and land) to particular projects (Mallon, 2004; Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). 
Holding close ties with officials in positions of power is a key determinant of capital allocation, so much 
so that a relationship can nullify the disadvantage of being a private firm in Vietnam.  
Displaying growth in credit funnelled to the Vietnamese private sector from foreign banks has 
highlighted the importance of such reforms. However, it is particularly useful to understand specific 
industries and sectors that have benefitted directly and what has been the role of the State therein 
(directly addressing RQ2). In order to do this, an analysis of bank-based lending by sector is required. 
Figure 19 displays a number of sectors that have seen substantial growth in credit provided to them, 
with “other activities”36 enjoying the most growth, as vibrant new retail businesses emerged. 
Vietnam’s “Industrial Development Strategy through 2025, vision toward 2035”, outlines a roadmap 
for the economy’s future development model. The strategy underscores the importance of secular 
growth opportunities and thus provides an understanding as to why these sectors of the economy are 
receiving an accelerating amount of credit. The objectives of the strategy are as followed: 
 
                                                          
36 “other activities” are those mainly compromised of retail lending 
Table 9: Vietnamese Industrial Development Strategy 
Source: (Chinhphu.vn, 2017) 
Strategy Number Goal 
1 Develop the Industrial Sector 
2 Prioritise agriculture, rural industrialisation and modernisation 
3 Integrate fully with the global economy, taking advantage of trade opportunities 
4 Develop dual-purpose industries to service national defence and security 
5 Promote the industrial sector on the basis of sustainable development 
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While both domestic and foreign banks do have some degree of autonomy and freedom to allocate as 
they wish, it is important to remember that, “if you are doing business in Vietnam, the role of the State 
is very, very big” (Mobius quoted in Bloomberg, 2013). The role of finance, therefore, becomes a tool 
of the State, used to achieve particular goals. As is the case with many soviet-style emerging economies, 
the Vietnamese State will often encourage credit allocation towards specific sectors by offering cheaper 
rates on debt, subsidies or tax relief:  
Times by times, the government encourages the development of some industries. The 
government can issue policies to guide the finance and banking sector to support specific 
sectors, for example, the power generation and distribution, the infrastructure and now the hi-
tech agricultural farming. (FA4, 2017) 
Evidently, the State retains a major influence on the direction of funds allocation, as the sectors it wanted 
to grow received the most finance. However, this is not problematic for two reasons. Firstly, foreign 
banks and private domestic banks are increasing their presence in the Vietnamese economy. As a 
consequence, factor inputs are more likely to flow to businesses that will use them most productively 
(FA5, 2017). Secondly, even in capitalist economies, it is common for governments to offer tax 
incentives or initiatives for specific industries – governments regularly intervene in markets in order to 
correct market failure. The development towards more efficient allocation of resources by the banking 
sector is encouraging, but they require further reform. The problem, however, is when banks allocate 
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business based on networks, rather than because of business acumen. Hence, new channels of 
investment are required to utilise resources at their maximum potential. 
Of all the developments to the financial sector made over this period, the one that has attracted the most 
attention is the capital markets, as commentators stress the importance of diversifying investment 
channels away from banks. Since their establishment, the Vietnamese capital markets have attracted 
700 listed companies (as of 2017), with a combined market capitalisation of over USD 78 billion. A 
large proportion of the growth has occurred as a result of SOE reform, as businesses have become 
equitised, transitioning into the private sector through initial public offerings (IPOs). However, 
Vietnam’s equity market is relatively small when compared to its Asian counterparts. This is because 
the majority of listings are small to medium enterprises (SMEs), with many of the more developed 
companies not yet listed due to a reluctance to commit to enhanced transparency (World Bank, 2014). 
In order to increase the quality and number of firms listed on the stock exchange, and therefore attract 
more foreign investors (whose shares accounted for around 15% of total market volume of the HOSE 
in Q3 of 2016), Vietnam launched a new stock index. The VNX Allshare serves as a composite index 
for Vietnam’s two stock exchanges, incorporating derivatives and exchange-traded funds (Nikkei Asian 
Review, 2016). Moreover, by equitizing some of the more developed firms that have more optimistic 
growth rates, Vietnam has hoped to make a wider range of securities available to investors (World Bank, 
2014).  
An over-reliance on, and vulnerability to, the banking sector for Vietnam has meant that the 
Government has repositioned its focus towards developing capital markets (FA2, 2017). Specifically, 
over-leveraged banks and mounting levels of NPLs challenge the stability of Vietnam’s financial 
system and economic development (World Bank, 2011). In order for Vietnam to continue such 
optimistic growth rates over the next 5-10 year horizon, huge injections of funds are required (TT3, 
2017). Approximately US 200 billion dollars are necessary to finance proposed supply-side projects 
(Vietnam Ministry of Planning and Investment, 2017). This capital requirement, however, is beyond 
the reaches of the Vietnamese government. 
The need for significant capital market development, most notably bond markets, is paramount for the 
success of the Vietnamese economy. Specifically, the main purpose is to fuel large injections of funds 
into new business opportunities, in order to spur on growth and enterprise (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). 
Through lifting embargos and previous sanctions for foreign investors, a business community is now 
present in Vietnam and funds channelled to prosperous business raises allocative efficiency (FA2, 
2017). While none of my respondents had directly listed through the stock exchange, a number of them 
had held positions at companies that required an extensive knowledge of capital market development 
over the last decade. The first assessment made about the stock market is that it is a new strand of 
financial services in Vietnam and it will take time to adjust to the market-mechanisms before it becomes 
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an effective venue through which to raise funds. Many interviewees explained that the process is 
complex and unfamiliar to businesses in seek of finance. Investors lack a comprehensive understanding 
of the regulatory structures surrounding capital markets, meaning that they are not a common means of 
raising funds: 
Sometimes younger people with enterprises will make use of this [equity markets], to issue 
shares. But most of the companies at the moment are not used to that form of fundraising. They 
do not want to go on stock market, as they have to share the power. The legal and financial 
framework is still difficult for them and prevents them from making use of bonds and equity. 
(FA5. 2017) 
The second assessment to make is that listing securities is an option, and is not suited to every firm’s 
business model. As previously discussed, debt and equity incur a cost to the firm. Whether this be 
through interest payments or dividends, firms looking to list have to consider a number of factors. 
Having said that, as Figure 20 shows, the stock exchanges have both demonstrated encouraging growth 
in recent years, reaching a combined market cap of USD 78 billion in early February 2017 (FA1, 2017). 
As Vietnamese entrepreneurs become more familiar with the market mechanisms, the stock market will 
become a major source of capital generation.  
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The government bond market in Vietnam accounts for 21.5% of GDP, which is low when compared 
with its fellow ASEAN counterparts (World Bank, 2017). With the average size of a bond issue being 
usually less than US 20 million dollars and a progressively tighter monetary policy37, growth of the 
bond market has stalled. The government bond market is further struggling, as 65% of government 
bonds are concentrated in the reserves of the SOCBs. Reserve requirements and liquidity regulations 
force the SOCBs to hold for longer periods, often to maturity (Hung, 2012). This means that they are 
not reaching the secondary market, resulting in illiquidity. In addition, a small investor base for the 
government bond market has meant that the market has a shortage of market makers. In this respect, 
regulation in Vietnam has resulted in an inactive bond market and the inability to raise funds. The 
government lacks the capabilities to initiate the debt required for spending on long-term infrastructure 
projects (Hung, 2012). Vietnam’s government bond market could benefit from a more liberalised 
financial system, allowing them to trade more freely. 
Despite issues, the bond market has witnessed growth in recent years (Figure 21), as fixed-income 
securities have grown from 15% of GDP in 2012 to 19.35% of GDP in 2015 (Vinacapital, 2016) – 90% 
of which are government bonds. With only a small proportion of the fixed income market made up of 
corporate loans, the majority of debt is state-owned. Although the fixed income market is still in its 
early stages of development (World Bank, 2014), there has been a concerted effort to address sluggish 
growth in corporate bonds. Specifically, attending to “ineffective primary markets, illiquid secondary 
markets, the absence of a solid institutional investor base and the absence of the necessary infrastructure 
and market support services” (World Bank, 2014:4). 
                                                          
37 Higher interest rates. 
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With the rise of the capital markets in Vietnam, particular industries have emerged with better access 
to funding than others. Therefore, it makes an interesting research topic as to why some sectors of the 
economy can raise debt or equity more easily, questioning the role of the State therein. As discussed in 
the literature review, the main benefits of enhanced privatisation and a movement towards capital 
market development is for better allocation of resources, managerial expertise and technological 
innovation. Given the development goals stated by Vietnam’s Industrial Development Strategy (Table 
9), it is clear to see why sectors such as Food & Beverage and Real Estate and Construction & Materials 
make up the bulk of equity (Figure 22). Vietnam’s SOEs, often referred to as “zombie companies”, 
threaten long-term economic growth by creating minimal jobs, contributing little to export earnings and 
maintaining inefficiencies – relative to their high running costs of the nation’s public finances. A major 
benefit of the stock market, however, is that it acts as a vehicle to transfer ownership of SOEs to the 
free market, with the view of making them more efficient: 
The Stock Market is growing in areas that the State wants to develop. The State is equitizing 
many of the SOEs in industries they view as essential to Vietnam’s economic growth…they 
have finally realised the benefits of the private sector. (BO2, 2017) 
Thus, equitisation of SOEs in industry sectors understood to be crucial to the future of sustainable 
economic growth is predicated on the hope that a higher proportion of funds will flow to productive 
enterprises. In addition to this, Vietnam revisited their laws on foreign investment, allowing foreign 
ownership of up to 100% for particular industries in 2016. Indeed for Le Net at LNT Partners (2017), 
“removal on the foreign ownership cap at 49% [means that] those needing capital to grow will be able 
to”. 
For companies looking to list, there are huge advantages. Debt and equity markets offer the ability for 
companies to tap into huge pools of funds, allowing firms to access the funds required for business 
expansion. Aside from being a source of credit, stock markets promote transparency and disclosure. 
Before listing, firms have to meet regulatory criteria, requiring the firm to be more accountable and 
trustworthy38. Additionally, there are tax incentives. Tax breaks have reached up to 50% for companies 
who are looking to list on the stock exchange. However, despite strong efforts to persuade companies 
to join the stock exchange, numerous firms do not meet the necessary pre-requisites. Many firms are 
waiting for the ‘right opportunity’ to list (BO3, 2017). That is, when the capital markets have matured 
a bit, after having gained depth and liquidity. The inauguration of the Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi Stock 
                                                          
38 Interviews revealed that not all firms, however, appreciate the importance of transparency and disclosure. Given 
Vietnam’s youth in terms of financial services, companies see transparency and disclosure as more of a hindrance 
to effective company management. In the long run, however, complying with regulatory standards is an essential 
part of business (Taussig and Malesky, 2009). Most notably, in order to attract a wide base of investors companies 
need to ensure financial reporting and documentation is accurate and reliable.  
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Exchanges are symbolic of contemporary capitalism and represent a commitment to the development 
agenda for the rest of the country.  
It is interesting to look at how the development of the stock market has changed the nature of capital 
allocation in Vietnam, specifically by looking at what sectors are accessing capital markets and which 
ones are not. Figure 22 provides a sectoral breakdown of the listed companies on the HCM stock 
exchange, providing an insight into what sectors most commonly use the capital markets as a means of 
financing operations. For many interviewees, there has been a realisation for the State, as to the potential 
of the private sector. Indeed, the sheer process of creative destruction allows for a better performance 
in the private sector.  
 
In order to entice more investment in hi-tech agriculture, and therefore stimulate growth in the sector, 
the State introduced a number of incentives. Specifically, the Prime Minister of Vietnam has proposed 
a number of awards applicable to food and beverage companies that promote hi-tech agriculture, upskill 
their labour and support the development of innovation in agriculture. Some agents explained that the 
Vietnamese state was actively applying tax incentives and subsidised land rentals for foreigners looking 
to invest in Vietnamese agriculture: 
The State wants to develop the food and beverage sector. That is why you have seen 
equitisation of SABECO, HABECO etc. In general, they want to maximise the innovation in 
that sector of the economy and ensure greater productivity…there has been a number of 
efforts to attract more investment. Whether that be tax breaks or partnerships with the private 
side, they are trying to do all they can to get more investment into food and beverage. (FA4, 
2017) 
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Companies have taken advantage of such investment opportunities, as Vingroup for instance has 
invested USD 94 million toward innovative agriculture projects (Vietnam Economic Times, 2015). 
However, this is one of few examples. The majority of agricultural firms in Vietnam struggled to raise 
the finances required for hi-tech developments, and historically have underperformed in attracting 
capital inflows. As the State raises more capital for innovative projects, the effects of incentivising 
investment for the food and beverage sector will likely materialise in the future (FA4, 2017). 
This public-private partnership has involved establishing a cooperative arrangement between the state 
sector and the private sector in order to reach a collective goal – attaining technological advances in 
agriculture (U1, 2017). By leveraging the commerciality of the private sector alongside the law-making 
capabilities of the State, this partnership hopes to stimulate more investment into the area. In this 
example, the State still plays an active role in dictating the nature of funds allocation, as more credit 
begins to flow towards this particular sector. Informants explained how a slow and gradual process to 
privatise the agricultural sector has helped create a better performing sector as well as attract more 
attention from the investment community: 
Previously foreigners were sceptical of investing in the agricultural industry. It was 
dominated by SOEs and therefore trying to compete was difficult. In recent years we have 
seen more state-owned enterprises becoming equitized and more efforts to create investment 
incentives. (FA2, 2017) 
Vinamilk, a dairy company previously owned by the State, underwent equitisation in 2016, as removal 
of the 49% foreign holding cap attempted to attract more investors. According to Vinacapital (2016), 
Vinamilk is the first significant SOE to equitise, representing deeper commitments from the government 
to develop the market economy39. While it is too soon to see the effects privatisation has had on the 
allocation of resources, the company’s annual reports indicate rising profits as it sells more shares to 
the public. Higher profitability indicates a more efficient company, as costs have been cut and revenues 
have grown.  
In recent years, the government has additionally made efforts to develop the real estate sector, as office 
towers, housing developments and retail centres have expanded in cities. In order to meet the 
accelerating demand for real estate, the State introduced initiatives to boost the market. First, the SBV, 
addressing a liquidity shortage in real estate corporations, lent $7.2 billion specifically for NPLs 
(VinaCapital, 2016). At the same time, real estate developments have received preferential interest 
rates. By alleviating companies of bad-debt pressure, there is more money for available investment 
                                                          
39 Previously, the State had been criticised for delaying or slowing the process of equitisation in the most profitable 
firms, while only selling off shares in the smaller ones. Vinamilk, however, was a market leader exhibiting strong 
growth patterns and increasing levels of profit (Reuters, 2016). The share sell off of one of the State’s most 
lucrative assets represents a full commitment to the development of the market economy.  
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elsewhere, such as low-income/affordable housing. Overall, these movements have served to create a 
real estate market more conducive to investment by promoting stability and confidence in the sector. 
The Law on Housing No. 65/2014/QH13 and Law on Real Estate Business No. 66/2014/QH13 were 
two pieces of legislation that focussed on attracting more foreign investors to the real estate industry. 
Specifically, the new legal framework provides foreign investment enterprises with similar rights and 
obligations to domestic entities. By enhancing the rights of foreign investors, housing developments are 
more accessible. Thus, the real estate market attracts a wider base of investors, enhancing liquidity. 
Higher volume of trading and investment in the real estate market means that more credit is available 
to boost the sector. Relaxed restrictions on foreign holdings in the Vietnamese real estate sector has led 
to a high degree of market capitalisation dominance, as it now accounts for 14% of total investment. 
Another sector of the economy that dominates the HCM stock exchange is construction, which accounts 
for 12.2% of market capitalisation. In order to sustain long-term productivity growth, investment in 
infrastructure has become central to Vietnam’s economic development model. Funding for which is 
estimated at approximately US 200 billion dollars – both from the public and private side (Vietnam 
Ministry of Planning and Investment, 2017). Consequently, the State designed incentives to allocate 
more funds towards construction and materials. Most recently, efforts to meet this capital requirement 
has included the equitisation of three new construction companies in March 2017. Faros Construction, 
Hao Binh Construction and Xanh Real Estate Service and Construction have all recently joined the 
FTSE Vietnam Index (Barrons, 2017). Further efforts to stimulate growth have included allowing a 
larger degree of ownership for foreigners looking to invest in construction companies (Indochine 
Counsel, 2017). Overall, the Vietnamese government has made positive steps toward enacting investor 
friendly policies in order to drive more investment towards the construction industry and therefore meet 
their development goals.  
Table 10 presents a breakdown of some of the biggest transactions done through the equity capital 
markets. As the Vietnamese State moves to hand more industry to the private sector, it represents an 
ideological change in Vietnam and commitment to the deepening of the capital markets. 
Clearly, there has been a consolidated effort in Vietnam to grow certain sectors of interest and achieve 
greater funding for companies that are experiencing a capital deficit. While the State maintains an active 
role in incentivising funds allocation, the sands have shifted. There is a much less aggressive approach 
to managing the economy. The State now looks to guide the economy, rather than control it.  
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Construction Company  Date of IPO Specialisation Equity Raised (USD) 
Tin Nghia Corporation April 2016 Storage and 
Warehouse rental 
services, agricultural 
products 
7.4 million 
CCI  July 2016 Construction 
Consultancy 
8.8 million 
Fico August 2016 Building Materials 12 million 
Vietnam Engine and 
Agricultural Machinery 
Corporation 
August 2016 Manufactures 
construction 
machinery in addition 
to automobile parts 
94.1 million 
Table 10: Some of the Biggest Construction Companies to IPO in 2016 
Source: FTSE Russell (2017) 
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4.5 The Future of Financial Development in Vietnam 
Financial development in Vietnam hinges on the State’s ideological perspective. Politicians committed 
to running a socialist orientated economy often support strengthening the role of SOEs. By contrast, 
politicians committed to developing the capital markets encourage equitisation of SOEs. The presence 
of SOEs in the economy has a number of effects in determining the nature of funds allocation in the 
economy – hindering capital market development, absorbing a large proportion of banking credit and 
reducing inflows of FDI. Overall, it is well documented that SOEs cause inefficient allocation of 
resources. Consequently, improving funds allocation in Vietnam will require further equitisation of 
SOEs. 
But well-executed equitisation is not the only obstacle to further financial development in Vietnam. 
Inadequacies in corporate governance, in both the state-sector and the private sector, undermine the 
development in the capital markets. While this holds true for most emerging economies, Vietnam ranks 
consistently low on the integrity index, much to the detriment of companies in search of funding. 
Supporting the rapidly emerging business sector therefore also requires further institutional 
developments to improve transparency and disclosure. Before firms can access finance, they need to 
legitimise their financial statements through working with third-party, independent auditors. In order to 
fully gain the trust of global investors, it is imperative that Vietnamese SMEs be more forthcoming in 
their approach to providing company information. 
Finally, in order to attract more investors Vietnam needs to advance the derivatives market. Adding 
more complexity and depth, through the ability to hedge investments, to the capital markets will attract 
a wider investor base and improve liquidity. At the same time, Vietnam must be cautious. Creation of 
derivatives markets, without strong regulatory systems in place can have disastrous effects for the 
economy. 
Although considerable efforts have gone into reforming the state-owned sector and levelling the playing 
field, the State maintains a high degree of control over funding allocation. SOEs maintain control over 
much of the commercial activity in Vietnam, exerting strong influence in the oil, mining, education and 
banking sectors (FA1, 2017). The role of SOEs in the economy and their control over market forces is 
largely a result of Marxist-Leninist ideology, which underpins much of Vietnam’s political structure. 
While some commentators argue that SOEs were initially designed to correct market failures, provide 
employment and limit inequality (Wacker, 2017), there has been a collective realisation concerning 
their mismanagement of resources, inefficiencies, low productivity and financial instability.  
Central to providing more funds to the economy is attracting a wider investment base, which, to some 
extent, the Vietnamese government has done through a consolidated effort to level the playing field for 
SOES and private firms. In 2007, the government began an ambitious plan, targeting 430 SOEs for 
divestment before 2016 (Allens & Linklaters, 2017). However, poor performance and lower than 
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expected amount of divestures has meant these targets have not been met.  Since then, revisions have 
been made and the Ministry of Planning and Investment targeted a further 375 SOEs to be divested by 
2020 (The Diplomat, 2017). Of the companies equitised, the State will only hold over 50% stakes in a 
minority of them while maintaining total control over areas of strategic importance such as defence, 
nuclear power and money printing.  
 
 
While the headline targets for SOE reform are encouraging (Figure 23), a number of barriers to effective 
equitisation remain, leaving the investment community somewhat alienated. Before a SOE can become 
equitized, there are a number of conditions that must be met. Specifically, they must be financially 
sound. However, as already noted, it is not common for SOEs to be profit making or in a healthy position 
with excess cash. Vinashin, for example, became accustomed to accessing cheap rates of credit, 
enjoying business sovereignty and receiving tax-breaks due to the fact that it was state-owned. In the 
long-run, however, this eroded its ability to remain competitive and maintain a healthy financial 
position, leading to debt-related insolvency. As is the case with many SOEs, their political status is a 
great hindrance to being a well-run business. When it comes to equitisation, therefore, SOEs often 
struggle to meet the criteria and are ultimately unable to become privatised. This common theme among 
SOEs – that they are inefficient and loss making – has become a barrier to successful equitisation. 
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 Figure 23: Number of 100% State-Owned Enterprises (1995-2010) 
Source: Nguyet (2015) 
*note: data not available for the period of 2006 & 2007. 
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While Vietnam has made progress in providing more systematic information and transparency, auditing 
standards are not as sophisticated as they need to be for the capital market to flourish. The current issue 
for corporate governance in Vietnam is that the majority of firms do not operate under a comprehensive 
legal structure or regulatory framework (OECD, 2015).  
In order to build trust among shareholders, many emerging economies adopt the G20-OECD principles 
of corporate governance. The principles underscore the importance of transparency and disclosure, to 
provide confidence to shareholders who avoid investing in companies with misleading financial 
performance indicators. Vietnam would benefit from such practices, applying effective law on 
information and publishing of reliable financial data, as it would instil confidence among investors, in 
turn fuelling capital market growth (TT1, 2017). Adhering to regulatory disclosure was a key theme 
that emerged from the interviews. For example, one interview highlighted it is common practice for 
companies to manipulate their systems of financial reporting, in order to either pay less tax or to achieve 
financing:  
SMEs try to get the balance between paying minimal taxes but also raising capital, and that’s 
why they’ll have multiple books. That’s the bottom line problem; everyone has two sets of books. 
People have different books, different reports to do whatever you need to do, whatever you need 
to do to legitimise your taxes. And then when it turns out you need a loan, you need to report 
the real numbers because you’ve claimed to be making no profit for the last 10 years (TT1, 
2017). 
With regard to accounting standards, all informants felt that Vietnam’s slow progress to date persists to 
be a major barrier to capital market development. Several respondents indicated dissatisfaction with 
current levels of transparency, explaining that this is the principal reason for why Vietnamese SMEs 
struggle to raise funds.  
A lack of available information means that equity investors struggle to operate effectively in the market 
economy, meaning that either they resort to speculation or they invest elsewhere. Transparency is good 
for capital markets because it reduces market inefficiencies. For those looking to invest in Vietnam, 
lower transparency increases the risk of investment, subsequently causing higher risk premiums, in turn 
reducing the attractiveness of the Vietnamese stock exchanges (FA2, 2017). Investors, therefore, may 
relocate their capital to other opportunistic ventures, resulting in a liquidity shortage for Vietnamese 
SMEs. Vietnam would therefore attract higher amounts of funding if it developed its regulatory 
framework – providing more security and reassurance for investors. 
Another benefit of developing a robust regulatory system is that it helps to provide macroeconomic 
stability – which is additionally good for capital markets. Historically, financial crashes have often been 
the result of faulty reporting (Barth and Landsman, 2010). Incorrect or misleading financial statements 
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have led to misinformation, and investors allocate funds based on false pretences. This leads to a loss 
of investment, followed by a mass exodus of liquidity, as investors flock to mitigate their losses. In the 
absence of reliable accounting standards, misallocation of funds results in less financially credible firms 
receiving investment. Many interviewees spoke to the importance of accounting standards in attracting 
more investment as a source of security for investment as it provided confidence in projected levels of 
growth and a strong balance sheet:  
Companies need to ensure that there is a comprehensive system with institutions of accounting, 
valuation and auditing in order to ensure the numbers presented are fair (TT1, 2017) 
When you are a foreign investor, participating in a capital raise, there is a strong chance of a 
company completely manipulating financial statistics (and this has happened to us and 
companies we’ve invested with) where we’ve bought in at 100 and the next day the owner raises 
money from friends and family at 80 and it dilutes us. (FA2, 2017) 
In general, Vietnam’s accounting and auditing standards are behind that of its South-East Asian 
counterparts, particularly for SMEs (Son Dang-Duc, 2011). This is because, historically, Vietnamese 
companies have tended to avoid international auditing firms under the impression that they are a 
hindrance to business. However, development over the last few decades has meant that more SMEs are 
committing to transparency. Informants spoke of how having a well-established, third party auditor was 
a pre-requisite to doing business in Vietnam: 
Usually part in parcel of us getting involved will be us being insistent on a KPMG or a PWC 
to actually audit their books because you know Vietnam like so many emerging markets and so 
many family businesses everywhere…there tend to be multiple sets of books. (FA2, 2017) 
Indeed, for many of the business owners interviewed, making use of an external and internationally 
recognised accounting firm was imperative for their company: “Now that we are a bigger firm, it is 
necessary to ensure that all of our books are professionally audited by an external company.” (BO3, 
2017). This was because for SMEs willing to “break” into the next stage of business development, 
adhering to international accounting and auditing standards was a requirement (Malesky et al., 2015). 
While SMEs have proliferated throughout the country and international investors have been generous 
in their allocation of funds towards such firms, the next phase of development in order to achieve 
sustainable, long-term growth of businesses in Vietnam is the evolution of accountancy and auditing 
standards (Taussig, 2005). Indeed, Malesky et al’s analysis (2015) of firms in Vietnam finds that there 
is a strong relationship between higher levels of transparency and investment.  
Finally, making the capital market more advanced through the introduction of more derivatives products 
would attract more investors to the market. Derivatives are an innovative concept for capital markets in 
emerging economies, giving the opportunity for investors to hedge exposure to risk. According to my 
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respondents, a local currency derivative market is of importance as it allows for foreign exchange and 
interest rate risk: 
It is a long only market too, no ability to short [bet on the asset going down] holds it back. 
Introduction of derivatives or other complex financial products would be essential to its 
maturity. (FA2, 2017) 
Currently, the derivatives market is under construction and commentators are optimistic about its 
development in the near future. By making it available to both Vietnamese and foreign investors, it will 
lead to a more attractive economy for investors to allocate funds in.  
The main benefit of derivatives markets is that investors can offset risk, encouraging more parties to 
speculate in the Vietnamese capital markets. Institutional and foreign investors would have more 
confidence in investing in Vietnamese corporates (bond and equity), knowing that there was a degree 
of risk mitigation: 
Previously where investors were fearful of investing into riskier securities, derivatives give 
them an option to minimise that risk. That means areas that previously were avoided are now 
going to receive inflows of capital. (FA2, 2017) 
This holds particularly true for emerging markets, where investing is inherently more risky. For 
example, options trading can allow the investor to benefit from maximum upside, whilst limiting the 
downside. A call option contract gives the right but not the obligation to buy the asset at an agreed price 
on or before a set date. The investor pays a premium, which acts like an insurance against a price crash. 
Overall, less capital is at risk and investors are able to enjoy the unlimited upside potential. 
Where previously investors avoided particularly riskier sectors of the economy, development of the 
derivative markets will facilitate their growth. The nature of funds allocation is likely to shift, as riskier 
industries previously struggled to attract larger injections of funds. For example, Vidra (2014) asserts 
that the fast-growing technology sector in Vietnam faced difficulty in achieving equity financing in 
recent years. Instead, technology SMEs rely on bank-based credit in order to expand their business. 
However, recent developments in the capital markets and derivatives market have been orientated 
around supporting Vietnam’s ICT sector (Ministry of Finance, 2010), as this has been identified as a 
key area for growth in the future.  
Before the capital market implements the derivatives market, it is imperative that they establish a strong 
supervisory body in order to regulate participants. In line with this, the State Security Commission 
(SSC) of Vietnam monitors how traders in the derivatives market conducts their behaviour. Regulatory 
bodies in Vietnam put in place mitigate systematic risk. While derivatives do undertake important risk 
transfer functions, they are additionally used to “speculate, manufacture exotic risk cocktails, keep 
dealings off-balance sheet and out-of-sight, increase leverage and arbitrage regulatory or tax rules” 
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(Financial Times, 2010: 2). This argument is reinforced by Ghysels and Seon (2005) who argued that 
the trading of futures contracts had a profound destabilising effect on asset prices in South Korea during 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.  
Subsequently, there is an argument to make that Vietnam should not adopt such a complex suite of 
projects, particularly as bond and equity markets are still in their embryonic stage. While derivatives 
markets do have their place in a number of economies, and the nature of them allow more complex 
approaches to risk management, for Vietnam the implementation could be somewhat overwhelming. 
Even in developed markets, where regulatory structures are well-established and transparency is 
significantly more advanced than Vietnam, derivative products can be dangerous. Tracing the financial 
histories of a number of other countries provides some valuable lessons to be learnt from a number of 
countries. Indeed, their very illiquid nature and multifaceted composition warrants extreme caution. In 
this light, many informants explained that Vietnam should focus on developing the “basic” foundations 
of the capital markets, before getting too advanced.  
However, this was not a consistent theme among all respondents, some of which felt that regulation in 
Vietnam was too strict. From this perspective, overbearing regulation acts as a curtailment to innovation 
and efficient operability of the markets: 
I think there is a lot of deregulation that needs to happen with the securities market to make it 
a true international standard market. Among other things, there are still restrictions, very 
severe restrictions, over foreign investors. They need to be lifted or liberalised quite 
significantly. (FA2, 2017) 
Thus, striking the balance between regulation and liberalisation poses a challenge for the Vietnamese 
State, particularly when introducing new products such as derivatives. Their paradoxical nature of 
being “risk-mitigating” while ostentatious and potentially dangerous exude the need for scrutiny and 
oversight.  
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4.6 Political-Economic Analysis 
Despite unanimous policy recommendations stipulating that SOE reform, deregulation of foreign 
restrictions and improving accounting and auditing standards are essential to the development of the 
capital markets, critics argue that the Vietnamese State’s overbearing role in economic governance is 
the underpinning factor. Moreover, foreign investors are limited in how much of a company they can 
own and levels of transparency lag behind developed economies. The question, then, is as to why, even 
two-decades after the birth of the capital markets, Vietnam has not followed IMF, OECD and WB 
recommendations. In short, given what Vietnam knows about the financial history of developed 
economies, why has the government not followed a similar pathway?  
Although the previous section supports the idea that reforms in the business-economy are required in 
order to develop the capital markets in Vietnam, addressing these issues alone will not ensure 
sustainable financial development. Instead, this section argues that these solutions are too simplistic – 
Vietnam is unique. Current literature underplays the importance of the complexity in the political-
economic framework of Vietnam. Government officials and SOE stakeholders have an overwhelming 
level of control on economic decisions. Thus, the bureaucratic regime should become the focal point of 
future investigation. Investors, academics and policy makers are required to understand Vietnam 
through a political-economic lens before making policy recommendations, as these factors shape the 
direction of Vietnamese capital markets. 
Research participants expressed differing explanations as to why, to date, economic reform has been a 
laborious process. Some informants praised the gradualist implementation of financial development 
policies – arguing that “big bang” approaches have historically had negative effects for that specific 
economy. Other interviewees felt that slow reform to date was necessary to maintaining socialist 
ideology, as well as allowing people to adapt to a market economy after having operated in a centrally 
planned economy for decades. By contrast, there were state-sceptics, who felt that the sluggish nature 
of economic reforms were a means to an end. That is, to support the formation of new business-state 
alliances. This section draws on the views of my research participants, seeking to understand why 
implementing basic policy advice has not worked in Vietnam so easily.  
The first explanation for why financial development in Vietnam has developed over such a long period 
is because a gradualist approach takes time. Proper sequencing of liberalisation coupled with 
development of regulatory institutions is essential to capital market longevity, but the economy cannot 
implement radical restructure in such a short time. Many interviewees felt that part of the reason for 
Vietnam’s reluctance to rapidly liberalise the financial sector was a result of “big bang” scepticism. 
Critics of the big bang approach argue that a rapid switch to a deregulated financial system can have 
disastrous effects for the economy, in some cases inducing a financial crash. An analysis of rapid 
financial liberalisation in Thailand displays the shortfalls in such a method, as a lack of institutions 
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results in unconstrained flows of funds. U1 (2017) explained that after having seen the pitfalls of 
excessive financial deregulation in neighbouring emerging economies such as Thailand, it is easy to 
understand why Vietnam’s financial trajectory has been slower than expected.  
While the basic elements of Thailand’s financial deregulation mirrored Vietnam’s, different sequencing 
and pace of reforms distinguishes the results. Thailand began extensive financial liberalisation under 
the application of the Alien Business Law (1972) and the Investment Promotion Act (1977), which 
encouraged foreign institutions to lend to firms in Thailand with minimal restrictions. The next stage 
was extreme liberalisation of exchange controls in the 1990s, which hoped to stimulate more FDI into 
the economy. Following this, the State accelerated growth in the role of private banks and financial 
institutions by reducing government intervention in the market and deregulating funding requirements 
– hoping to improve financial efficiency. Finally, the Bangkok International Banking Facility (1993) 
offered a number of incentives in order to leverage more foreign credit. For example, Thai Banks 
enjoyed tax breaks if they borrowed from abroad – as they hoped to leverage foreign credit. The quick 
succession of liberal financial policies combined with the floating of the Thai Baht led to the mass 
accumulation of foreign debt. Excessive levels of capital inflows popped asset bubbles, as the property 
market crashed in 1995 and the stock market in 1996. Where previously Thailand had promised 
investors lucrative returns, the depreciation of the Thai baht ignited a mass exodus of funds, and the 
economy collapsed. Excessive and unregulated liberalisation sparked the onset of the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997.  
Vietnam, however, adopted a different approach to financial development – ensuring that restrictions 
prevented piling amounts of foreign debt. This meant was that the impacts of the AFC on Vietnam were 
limited, although Vietnam still experienced lower growth rates following 199740. Informants 
interviewed explained the slow development of financial liberalisation in Vietnam was a strategic move 
and part of the gradualist approach: 
Vietnam is just adjusting to the capital markets. It is not going to happen overnight. The stock 
exchanges only been about for just over a decade or so (TT2, 2017)  
If you don’t build world-class financial institutions then you’re exposed to financial turmoil. I 
think it is important for people to bear in mind that Vietnam’s regulatory framework is 
underdeveloped and that is why there are still heavy restrictions. (FA5, 2017) 
 
                                                          
40 GDP growth slowed down from 9.3% in 1996, to 4.8% in 1999. However, this was marginal when compared 
to its Asian counterparts. Thailand for example suffered a shrinkage of growth from 5.7% in 1996 to -7.6% in 
1998 (Trading Economics, 2017).  
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Indeed, while basic policy prescriptions recommend relaxed laws on global integration – as it has served 
to benefit the emerging economies to a large degree41 – solutions are not that simple. Vietnam, in 
particular, has exercised caution in ensuring that the economy is not overly dependent on foreign credit. 
Vietnam’s sequential financial liberalisation involved imposing restrictions on foreign bank presence 
and caps on foreign holdings of Vietnamese equity. In this case, the correct application was crucial for 
Vietnam in deterring the potential pitfalls of financial liberalisation.  
Yet, this slow process of reform does not explain why SOEs are so dominant. According to PwC’s CEO 
Pulse Survey (2015), there are three key motivations for government ownership which are: to further 
social outcomes, to provide physical infrastructure and to create stability in times of financial crisis. 
The survey presents an insight, therefore, into why SOE reform has been slow. According to my 
interviewees, the State needs to maintain control over strategic industries and run the economy in the 
interests of the people; ensuring excessive inequality does not occur.  In the case of Vietnam, informants 
described that SOEs are an instrument of the State, used to subsidise necessity goods and provide 
employment. Specifically, the State will subsidise the cost of particular goods, deemed necessary, in 
order to ensure that the market does not price people out of buying it. For example, petrol is one such 
good. In Vietnam, petrol is viewed as a “necessity good” (FA2, 2017) and therefore is heavily subsidised 
by the State. Without subsidisation, the cost of petrol would be too expensive, given the current wage 
rates42: 
State-owned enterprises subsidised a lot of the goods and services that were previously too 
expensive for everybody to afford. Petrolimex, for example, is a state-run company (FA2, 2017) 
The State intervenes in the market, through SOEs, exerting a level of control in the oil and gas sector, 
in order to ensure widespread access. In this way, the state provides petrol as a “public good”, which 
would otherwise price people out of using a necessity good. Ultimately, the State has furthered social 
outcomes. 
Given the role of SOEs in the economy, as both an employer and provider of goods and services, the 
Vietnamese State has struggled to radically reform the state sector. For example, despite their 
inefficiencies, SOEs have historically contributed to annual levels of GDP (~30%), exports (~50%) and 
job creation (1.2million/year). Moreover, SOEs, theoretically, conduct business operations in the 
interests of society (McCargo, 2004) – a fundamental principle of socialist ideology. Although criticised 
for inefficiencies, proponents of SOEs argue that this is because maximising employment is a core 
function (Sjöholm, 2006). By contrast, private firms are more stringent with their labour expenditure, 
looking to cut costs where possible. It is in the nature of SOEs to provide jobs for the population, rather 
                                                          
41 Through increased investment and a larger export market. 
42 In 2015, the average monthly wage rate was approximately USD 224.  
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than chasing profit maximisation. Therefore, according to this view, SOEs meet their expected 
requirements – as they preserve and generate employment in the national interest43: 
Most people have a job in Vietnam. That’s what SOEs do; they provide people with jobs and 
some basis of regular income. While they might not be making profit, at least they reduce 
inequality. (FA4, 2017) 
You cannot undo such a big sector of the economy overnight. Millions would become 
unemployed and costs of goods would go up. Restructuring an economy takes time and the 
government has to ensure they do it right. (TT3, 2017) 
Thus, as McCarty (1999) notes, state enterprise reform – in any transitional economy – will inevitably 
engender unemployment and spark social unrest. Fritzen (2002) found that, despite having achieved 
extraordinary rates of growth in recent years, inequality has risen as a result. Specifically, as SOEs no 
longer provide mass employment, income inequality is on the rise. Indeed, despite having a wealthier 
economy overall than several comparator countries, Vietnam ranks towards to bottom end for per capita 
income (Fritzen, 2002). Consequently, respondents explained the State was reluctant to initiate radical 
reforms in fear of causing inequality44. Overall, following “basic” policy advice is more complex than 
simply equitisation. In order to ensure successful reform, the government must take into account a 
multitude of factors and be meticulous in its approach to strike the right balance handing over control 
to the free market and governing the economy in the interests of economic welfare.  
SOEs, therefore, are a vehicle for implementing Vietnam’s ideological vision, as principles of socialism 
determine the nature of resource allocation. Considering Vietnam’s socialist orientation, this is an 
explanation for why they have not followed SOE reform recommendations set by institutions 
specialising in developmental economics. As a result, there has been a conflict of interest in Vietnam, 
between reforming SOEs and developing the market-mechanisms against the provision of socialised 
industries. On the one hand, the free market allocates scarce resources most efficiently. On the other, 
SOEs help to mitigate excessive levels of inequality through the job allocation and subsidised goods 
that would otherwise leave people priced out. In short, from the perspective of the Vietnamese 
government, it is better to tolerate inefficiencies and benefit the whole of society, rather than hand 
complete control to the private side and increase inequality. Formulating a coherent plan on how best 
                                                          
43 However, the extent to which the State does meet employment requirements is questionable. In recent years, 
the State sector’s ability to generate employment has been compromised. The SOE sector only accounts for 15% 
of total employment in the economy. (https://www.export.gov/article?id=Vietnam-Competition-from-State-
Owned-Enterprises)  
44 In addition to Vietnam, Katsuji’s (2000) analysis of SOE reform in China explained how following privatisation 
in the latter half of the 20th century resulted in high unemployment, increased cost of living and social tensions. 
Specifically, the number of workers dropped from 105million to 78million between 1996 and 2000 – marking a 
25.7% decrease. While private sector rates of employment increased, it did not make up the difference (Kanamori 
and Zhao, 2004).   
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to reform SOEs, whilst adopting a market-based economy, therefore complicates basic policy advice, 
explaining why financial systems are still underdeveloped. 
 
A more critical theory was that state sector reform is characterised by a political hunger to maintain 
state power and further crony capitalism. As discussed in previous chapters, relationships with 
government officials inherently define business success in Vietnam. Indeed, politically connected 
enterprises enjoy particular advantages in business – most notably in accessing credit. Research 
participants, therefore, felt that the state-led development strategy was a means to an end to fulfil its 
own desires rather than to improve the welfare of the general population. 
The first sub-theory that emerged from this theme was that SOEs deliberately delay the process of 
reform in order to maintain positions of power (FA1, 2017). Privatisation of SOEs is a major threat to 
key stakeholders. Individuals in senior positions enjoy huge pay packets as well as additional benefits 
such as social status, security of employment and preferential access to economic resources. This 
problematizes SOE reform. According to Shimomoto (2003: 56), many SOEs consider “equitisation as 
an end of government support, they have a negative response to government initiatives”. Therefore, 
government officials and SOEs work together to attain mutual benefit – ensuring that the SOEs do not 
reform. In return, politicians receive payment in the form of briberies. Many interviewees expressed a 
view that the State has become an agent of SOE stakeholders, exchanging monetary gifts for 
competitive advantage in business: 
Politicians will gladly accept your money as a gift. There is an old Vietnamese saying, ‘money 
first, everything else after.’ (BO1, 2017) 
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Of course the State and businesses work together. Why wouldn’t they? From the businesses 
perspective, you have a competitive advantage, in almost every sphere of the economy. And for 
the politicians, well they just get more and more money. (FA1, 2017) 
Imagine… the Prime Minister’s salary in Vietnam is about $20 million a month. A lot is from 
bribes. How can you not be corrupt? (BO1, 2017) 
While obtaining evidence to support this theory is difficult, extensive literature emphasises the 
importance of political networks in business success (Le and Nguyen, 2009; Venkatesh and Nguyen, 
2006; Malesky and Taussig, 2008). Many interviewees additionally expressed that there are high levels 
of corruption and a number of “grey areas” between businesses and the State. Favourable relationships 
between particular business owners and the State are beneficial to both parties, begging the question as 
to why state reform would be accelerated.  
The second sub-theory that emerged from the idea of business-state relations was more complex. Some 
interviewees expressed the idea that the reform process had been a means to an end for the State to 
reaffirm power. Increasing societal pressure in 1986 drew attention to economic turmoil and SOE 
inefficiencies, leaving the State with little option but to restructure the economy. However, while the 
reforms of the Doi Moi appear to be breaking down state bureaucracy, informants argued a different 
perspective. Interviewees believed that the State introduced financial development policies in order to 
maintain authority and facilitate a new sector of the economy, that is, partnerships between state and 
businesses based on corruption. Informants explained that the State could additionally benefit from 
privatisation, as collaborating behind closed doors would mean more advantages for government 
officials involved in the deal. Moreover, they stated that the State liberalised the economy in fear of 
another civil war breaking out or a revolution against persistent corruption – it was easier to liberate the 
economy than it would be to deal with protests and uprising. Little was to be lost from liberalisation, as 
those at the top of the political hierarchy would maintain their position of power. Painter (2005) voices 
a similar theory, arguing that financial liberalisation in Vietnam has consolidated state power and 
established new state-business alliances. Therefore, resulting in the formation of a new commercial 
environment, continuing the plutocratic elite. Indeed, the integration of Vietnam into global capital 
markets was anything but a threat to the Vietnamese government. Rather, it allowed the State to 
“salvage and refine a managerial regime whose previous policies had seriously tarnished it” (Woodside, 
1997 quoted in Painter, 2005).  One interviewee questioned why anyone in a position of power would 
want to initiate change, explaining that economic reform was little more than a façade:  
Basically where previously you had state-owned companies and their inefficiencies, you now 
have state-private companies and their corruption… The State benefits from a vibrant private 
sector, because a portion of the money is channelled to them… SOE reform is slow because the 
people are happy where they are. Why would they want things to change? Many people at the 
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top are delaying the process of equitisation so that they can maintain their authority and their 
wealth. (BO1, 2017) 
However, corruption extends beyond SOEs, as slow progress in reforming accounting and auditing 
standards to date have overwhelmingly cited as a critical issue. According to my informants, the main 
reason why accounting and auditing systems remain underdeveloped is that levels of corruption 
between businesses and government are high. For companies under review, manipulation of company 
reports are often a strategic move to avoid paying taxes47. A number of interviewees expressed that even 
independent auditors were subject to corruption. Many drew on examples of where cash, in the form of 
bribes, has been an essential part of negotiation between auditors and effective reporting of financial 
numbers: 
SMEs try to get the balance between paying minimal taxes but also raising capital, and that’s 
why they’ll have multiple books. (TT1, 2017) 
They [auditors] make up things, like “that salary is too high”, “this doesn’t count as an 
expense” or “this red receipt is wrong in some way”. Then they come up with a stat of maybe 
$10,000. And then we have to increase our profit by $10,000. We discuss, an envelope is slipped 
and it comes about $4,000. So we pay a tax and an envelope and that is it. Every year they have 
to physically audit and negotiate more tax for the government. It’s a fact of doing business in 
Vietnam. (TT1, 2017) 
Even listed companies that are audited by international companies in Vietnam is even messed 
up, because it is hard not to be crooked if you’re in a crooked country. (BO1, 2017) 
Interviews revealed that the extent of the problem by stating that corrupt dealings are ingrained 
Vietnamese culture. Thus, the root of policy changes lies with within the political economic structures. 
In this light, corruption is deep-rooted in business practices. Thus, the root of policy change lies deeper 
than a blanket approach, there is no generic or easy fix. Instead, greater focus must be applied to the 
political-economic structures if progress is to be made.    
From this perspective, the delayed process of liberalisation is a result of a corrupt political-economic 
framework. Financial reform was a medium through which to retain political power, silencing pressures 
from society. Subsequently, political power advances business development for the well connected. For 
those working in SOEs, politicians have delayed reform to receive a constant stream of bribery income. 
For those working in private firms, politicians ensure they enjoy favourable business conditions, for the 
same reasons. In both instances, Vietnam ignored basic policy recommendation for financial 
                                                          
47 As higher earnings means higher taxation. 
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development. Corrupt business-state alliances are one potential explanation for lacklustre 
implementation of basic policy. 
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5. Conclusions 
This dissertation has outlined the journey of Vietnam’s financial development, from the perspective of 
business owners, academics and financial analysts. Shifts in political ideology have governed the 
pathway for economic reform in Vietnam, and consequently altered the nature of funds allocation for 
SMEs. The objective of this research was to extend work done on financial development in emerging 
markets, with a nuanced approach of providing a narrative. Financial economics is a largely dominated 
by quantitative analysis, paving way for qualitative research to bring nuance to the debate. By engaging 
in deeper conversation and probing questions, this thesis was able to look beyond modelling of numbers 
and tease out further explanations and causality. In response to the research questions, this paper makes 
four arguments. 
First, financial development in Vietnam has had positive effects for the economy. Enhanced provision 
of investment services has meant that more SMEs in Vietnam have been able to expand and grow their 
business. As the Vietnamese economy evolves, investment channels have diversified away from State 
control. Accessing funds has been facilitated by bank-based services, FDI and capital markets. 
However, SMEs face a number of barriers when attempting to raise funds;  namely a lack of 
connections, a lack of previous business experience and a lack of collateral. At the start of Vietnam’s 
financial liberalisation, financial development engendered growth as it provided new opportunities to 
access funding and fuel expansion projects (supply leading). However, as time has gone on, more 
developed financial systems are required to keep up with the pace of economic growth. In this way, the 
finance-growth nexus has been demand following. The Vietnamese economy has grown to such scale 
that a funding gap exists. Financial systems in Vietnam are required to develop and modernise, similar 
other south-eastern Asian neighbours, if economic growth is to continue at current rates.  
Second, financial development has changed the nature of funds allocation and generated winners and 
losers as a result. The agriculture, real estate and construction industries benefit from easier access to 
finance. The State maintains an active role in shaping the economy, rather than exerting totalitarian 
control over business. In this way, capital flows are governed by the State, towards areas that are 
understood to be “strategic”. Moreover, enhanced global integration has enabled more funds to enter 
the circular flow of the economy. Where previously businesses understood to be too risky were unable 
to access finance, this is no longer the case. This has meant that the nature of funds allocation has shifted 
away from industries previously dominated by relational-financing towards more prosperous 
enterprises, as well as ones deemed to be more ‘risky’. 
Third, although this dissertation holds a neutral stance over the sequencing of liberalisation, Vietnam 
provides additional evidence that a gradualist approach enhances efficient allocation of resources, 
whilst avoiding excessive boom and bust cycles. Frontier economies and emerging markets could 
benefit from understanding Vietnam’s story of financial development. They can learn from the progress 
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made, but also the criticisms from international investors. Namely, this involves enhancing corporate 
governance to achieve the desired results in capital accessibility, stimulating more investment. It is a 
consistent theme among basic policy advice, that enhancing transparency, disclosure and financial 
reporting instils investors with greater confidence. A commitment to better accountancy standards is 
likely to have beneficial macroeconomic effects, engendering a more productively efficient economy. 
Fourth, basic policy advice for financial development does not work because countries are inherently 
unique. Rather, academics and policymakers have to look to the political-economic structures of the 
economy in order to address how to promote financial development. In the Vietnamese context, 
hierarchies of power and business are dominated by corruption and crony capitalism – preventing 
efficient allocation of scarce resources. In order to attract more investors and ensure that capital markets 
operate effectively, the Vietnamese economy needs to breakdown structures of power and ideology that 
plague financial development. 
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Appendix 
 
Sample of questions used in interviews: 
1) What was the Vietnamese economy like before 1986? 
2) How did the state operate at this time? 
3) How did business operate at this time? 
4) What were some of the key policies designed at this time to progress the economy? 
5) How did businesses respond to the change in policy direction? 
6) What are some of the factors that currently restrict financial development in Vietnam? 
7) What are the primary sources of capital in Vietnam? 
8) To what extent does “policy lending” still play a part in the allocation of capital? 
9) What are some of the sectors which have benefitted  as a result of financial development? 
10) What has been the impact of foreign banks in Vietnam? 
11) What additional reforms are required to develop the capital markets? 
12) What role do SOEs play in the economy? 
13) Do you think the derivatives market as a place in Vietnam? 
14) If you are a business owner, what are some of the advances you would like to see in the 
Vietnamese financial system in order to raise capital more efficiently? 
15) How would you describe your experiences of financial development in Vietnam? 
16) Are there any other points of discussion that might be relevant to my project? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
